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THE  RESPONSE  of investment  expenditure  to changes  in interest  rates is 
at the heart  of any analysis  of stabilization  policy. The more sensitive  the 
response,  the more potent  is monetary  policy and the weaker  is fiscal  ex- 
penditure  policy.  The stimulus  of lower  interest  rates  on investment  is one 
of the principal  channels  of monetary  influence  in virtually  all macroeco- 
nomic  theories.  On the other  hand,  the  negative  influence  of higher  interest 
rates  on investment  may inhibit  the macroeconomic  effect  of expenditure 
policy. The net effect of  government  expenditures  on gross national 
product  has been and remains  the single most important  source of dis- 
agreement  over stabilization  policy among  economists.  My purpose  here 
is to examine  the empirical  evidence  on the  interest  response  of investment 
with  the hope of narrowing  the disagreement  about  the effects  of expendi- 
ture  and  monetary  policies.  Though  the evidence  is disappointingly  weak, 
it does suggest  that the modem Keynesian  view embodied  in large-scale 
macroeconometric  models-that  the expenditure  multiplier  is around  1.5 
-and  the simple monetarist  view-that  it is essentially  zero-are  both 
incorrect.  The most reasonable  value lies in the middle,  perhaps  at 0.7. 
Unfortunately,  the evidence  is probably  not strong  enough  to convince  the 
firm  adherent  of the other  two positions. 
Note:  This research was supported by the National Science Foundation. I am 
grateful to  Dale  W. Jorgenson and members of  the Brookings panel for helpful 
comments. 
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The Empirical  Issues 
The interest  response  of investment  depends  fundamentally  on the sub- 
stitutability  of capital  for other factors, and there seems to be general 
agreement  today that factor substitution  can take place. In fact, the uni- 
tary-elasticity  property  of the Cobb-Douglas  production  function  is not a 
bad summary  of the findinigs  of more general  studies:  a decline  of 1 per- 
cent in the service  price  of capital  raises  the capital-output  ratio  by about 
1 percent.  But this  is a long-run  relationship,  and  it is much  less generally 
agreed  that  the flow  that  brings  about  the change  in the capital  intensity- 
extra  investment-is highly  responsive  to changes  in the price of capital 
over the one- to three-year  horizon of chief concern in stabilization. 
Skeptics  about the interest  elasticity of investment  point to three con- 
siderations  that cause the adjustment  in factor intensities  to take place 
slowly: 
1.  Lags in putting capital goods in place.  It can take at least a year to 
design,  order,  build,  and  install  capital  equipment  after  a change  in relative 
factor  prices  makes  new  equipment  desirable. 
2.  The  putty-clay  hypothesis.  Capital  already  in  place  cannot  be 
adapted  to a different  capital  intensity;  factor  proportions  are  fixed  at the 
time the equipment  is designed.  Changes  in factor  intensities  dictated  by 
changes  in the price  of capital  take  place  only as the old capital  is replaced. 
3.  The term structure of interest rates.  Stabilization policies affect the 
short-term  interest  rate, but investment  responds  to the long-term  rate. 
Long  rates  respond  to short  rates  with  an  important  lag. 
Evidence  from  a variety  of sources,  discussed  below,  seems  to converge 
on the  point  that  lags  in the  investment  process  are  long enough  to limit  the 
immediate  effect  of changes  in the service  price of capital  on investment. 
The investment  taking  place in a given  year  is largely  the consequence  of 
irrevocable  decisions  made  in earlier  years,  and only a small  fraction  can 
be affected  by changes  in that  year  in the financial  attractiveness  of invest- 
ment.  This  consideration  makes  expenditure  policy  stronger  and  monetary 
policy weaker  than they would be in an economy with more flexibility 
about  investment  in the  short  run. 
Evidence  on the putty-clay  hypothesis  is much more ambiguous.  The 
paper  contains  a theoretical  exposition  of the hypothesis  that emphasizes 
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Under  putty-clay,  firms  do not face an economic  decision  about  how much 
output  to produce  on their existing  capital  equipment.  If there is such a 
decision-for  example,  if more output can be squeezed  out of existing 
equipment  by operating  it for longer  hours  or adding  more  labor  in other 
ways-then  the putty-clay  hypothesis  in its strict  form is wrong and the 
response of investment  to the service price of capital is not just the 
change in the factor intensity of newly installed capacity  but involves 
substitution  between  new and  old capital  as well. The paper  demonstrates 
a serious  problem  in the major  existing  attempt  to measure  the influence 
of the putty-clay  phenomenon  in the investment  equation.  No definite 
conclusion  emerges  about  the  importance  of putty-clay. 
The question  of the proper  interest  rate for an investment  equation  is 
tackled  only at the theoretical  level. The simple  argument  that capital  is 
long-lived  and  that  consequently  the investment  decision  should  be based 
on the long-term  interest  rate  is examined  and  confirmed,  but  this  principle 
does not imply  that the service  price of capital  depends  on the long rate. 
Rather,  the service  price  emerges  from a comparison  of investment  deci- 
sions  made  this  year  on the  basis  of this  year's  long  rate,  and  those  that  will 
be made  next year on the basis of next year's  long rate. This comparison 
involves  the expected  change  in the long rate, which is measured  by the 
current  short  rate.  As a matter  of theory,  it seems  quite  unambiguous  that 
an investment  theory  built  around  the concept  of a service  price  of capital 
should  use the short  rate.  The prospect  for empirical  confirmation  of this 
principle  seems slight, in view of the major difficulties  associated  with 
measurement  of the role of interest  rates  of any  kind. 
An Empirical  IS-LM  Framework 
Generations  of economists  have been taught to study the effects of 
monetary  and fiscal policy within  Hicks' IS-LM framework.  In the dia- 
gram  below the IS curve  traces  the combinations  of the interest  rate and 
real  gross  national  product  that  are  consistent  with  the expenditure  side of 
the economy.  Higher  interest  rates  are  associated  with  lower  levels  of GNP 
because  of the negative  response  of investment.  The LM curve  describes 
the alternative  interest rates and levels of GNP that clear the money 
market.  Higher  levels of GNP require  higher  interest  rates to clear the 
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expenditures  shift  the  IS curve  to the right,  say to IS'. Real GNP  rises  from 
Y to Y'. The magnitude  of the increase  depends  on the relative  slopes of 
the two curves:  it is large  if the LM curve  is flat and  the IS curve  is steep 
and small  in the opposite  case. An increased  money  supply  shifts  the LM 
curve  to the right,  say to LM". Again, the effect  on GNP depends  on the 
relative  slopes  of the two curves:  monetary  policy  is potent  if the IS curve 
is flat  and  the  LM curve  is steep. 
The central  question  of this  paper  can  be stated  succinctly  in the IS-LM 
framework:  how  flat  is the  IS curve  relative  to the  LM curve?  An algebraic 
development  of the IS-LM  model is a necessary  prelude  to an empirical 
study.  Start  with  a simple  consumption  function: 
C -  o +  61Y, 
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where C is consumption in real terms and Y is real GNP, and thus 0, is 
the marginal propensity to consume out of GNP. Next is the investment 
function, 
I I+  eY Y-72y; 
where  I is real investmermt  and r is the interest  rate;  GyN  measures  the ac- 
celerator  effect of output  on investment  and y2 is the crucial  interest  re- Robert E. flail  65 
sponse. The expenditure  side of the economy  is governed  as well by the 
GNP  identity, 
Y = C +  I +  GI 
where G is real government  expenditures.  The IS curve is obtained  by 
solving  the  three  equations  for r as a function  of Y: 
r  do  +  yo  +  G -(I  -  01 -  1)  Y 
72 
The  final  equation  is the  money-demand  function, 
M/p  =  -1'o  +  '1 Y -  VI2  r, 
where  M is the nominal  money supply  and p is the price level; 'P.  is the 
income  response  of money  demand  and  2 iS the  interest  response.  The  LM 
curve  is just  the  money-demand  function  solved  for  r: 
r-  0 +  AY  -  M/p 
'P2 
The  intersection  of the  IS and  LM  curves  is obtained  by equating  them  and 
solving  for Y: 
Y  =o  +  I,  G +  g2 M/p, 
where  pu,  is the  effect  of expenditures  on GNP: 
1 
1-01  -  7Yl +  IP  (72/P2)' 
Note the crucial  role of the ratio  of the two slope  parameters,  y2/'2.  If the 
IS curve  is steep and  the LM curve  is flat, y2/'2  is small  and  t,u  is close to 
the simple Keynesian multiplier, 1/(1  -  0,  -  Yl).  With a flat IS and a 
steep LM curve, 72/2  will  be large, ,t  will be small, and the interest-rate 
effect  will  largely  offset  the  simple  multiplier  effect. 
The  influence  of the  real  money  supply  is described  by2: 
rU=  4  l  +  (-  01 -  7')  (VP2/72)- 
Again, the ratio of the slope parameters,  'P2/Y2,  plays a central  role, now 
in reciprocal  form.  If the IS curve  is steep and the LM curve  is flat,  'P2/y2 
is large  and  pt2  is small.  With  a flat  IS and a steep LM curve,  the effect  of 
monetary  expansion  on GNP will be close to the extreme  value of the 
crude  quantity  theory,  1/'P,. 
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em U.S. economy?  In the first  place,  it takes  the real  money  supply,  M/p, 
as predetermined  by monetary  policy. Unless the monetary  authorities 
offset every movement  in prices, exogeneity  of M/p is realistic  only if 
prices  are  taken  as predetermined-that  is, if the  price  level does  not react 
to developments  in the economy  within the period.1  This paper is con- 
cerned  with the effect  of stabilization  policy only for the first  year after 
policy actions  are  taken.  A good deal of recent  research  on price  determi- 
nation  seems  to support  unresponsive  prices as a reasonable  approxima- 
tion,  though  there  are  some  important  dissenters. 
The responsiveness  of prices  to stabilization  policy over a longer  hori- 
zon influences  the results  even when  the analysis  concerns  only the initial 
year after a policy action. Investment  depends  on the real interest  rate 
while  money  demand  depends  on the nominal  interest  rate,  and  the differ- 
ence between  them is the expected  rate of inflation  from one year to the 
next. The assumption  of unresponsive  expectations  about  the rate  of infla- 
tion could be justified  either  as an extension  of the rigid-price  hypothesis 
to the second  year  or as a failure  of rational  expectations. 
Experiments  with a more elaborate  model that  permits  a good deal of 
price  flexibility  in the first  year  and  even  more  in the second  suggested  that 
the rigid-price  case enhances  the stimulus  of monetary  policy by a con- 
siderable  margin  and slightly  diminishes  the effect  of expenditure  policy.2 
Since  the firmest  believers  in the efficacy  of expenditure  policies  generally 
also consider  prices rigid or deny rational  expectations,  it seems best to 
proceed  on the hypothesis  of unresponsive  prices. 
The simple  model  also  omits  any  influence  of interest  rates  on consump- 
tion, either directly or through  the effects of wealth on consumption. 
Though  the evidence  seems to support  the life-cycle permanent-income 
hypothesis,  in which consumption  depends  entirely  on a comprehensive 
measure  of wealth,3  there  is little evidence  about  the influence  of interest 
rates  on that  measure  of wealth.  The  short-run  correlation  of interest  rates, 
the stock  market,  and  consumption  may  not identify  the structural  relation 
1. Of course, prices this year react to events in earlier years, so prices vary over 
time. Predetermined  does not mean fixed over time. 
2. The model with rational expectations  appears  in Robert E. Hall, "The Macro- 
economic Impact of  Changes in Income Taxes in the Short and Medium Runs," 
Journal of Political Economy, special issue, forthcoming. 
3.  See Robert E. Hall, "The Life Cycle-Permanent  Income Hypothesis and the 
Role of Consumption  in Aggregate Economic Activity" (Massachusetts  Institute of 
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among  them  because  they all react  strongly  to other  economic  events  and 
influences.4  In any case, zero interest-elasticity  of consumption  is an ap- 
propriate  assumption  for this  paper  because  any  such  response  would  only 
make  the IS curve  flatter  and  expenditure  policy  even less effective. 
The model also assumes  a closed economy, or more precisely,  that 
imports  and exports  do not respond  within  a year  to changes  in GNP and 
interest rates. Adding import and export equations sensitive to GNP 
would  change  the Keynesian  multiplier  only slightly,  and  thus  would  only 
slightly  alter  the estimates  of the policy effects,  y1 and  .  The omission 
of interest  rates  from  the net demand  for foreign  goods is more  serious- 
even the direction  oi this  effect,  let alone  its magnitude,  is unsettled  today. 
PARAMETER  ESTIMATES 
Most of the paper  will concern  the numerical  values  of the parameters 
of the investment  equation.  Their implications  will be studied  against  a 
particular  set of values of the parameters  of the other equations  of the 
simple  IS-LM  model. The appendix  discusses  the sources  for these esti- 
mated parameter  values. Briefly, the marginal  propensity  to consume 
(MPC) out of GNP, 01, is taken as 0.36, which  includes  the accelerator 
effects  on consumer  durables  as well as the conventional  MPC for non- 
durables  and  services.  There  are  good reasons  to think  that  0.36 overstates 
the true structural  response  of consumption  to the transitory  changes  in 
income  brought  about  by various  stabilization  policies.5  As the formulas 
for 1q  and  Ic2  show,  the  upward  bias  in 0 will  result  in an upward  bias  in the 
response  of GNP  both  to expenditures  and  to money,  but  in the light  of the 
values  of the other  parameters,  the  bias  turns  out  to be quite  small. 
The critical  parameters  of the model  apart  from  those  of the investment 
equation  are the effect  of income  on money  demand,  +,  and the effect  of 
the interest  rate on money demand,  q2. From the somewhat  mixed evi- 
dence discussed  in the appendix,  I settled on the following  compromise 
estimates  of the  two  parameters: 
-increase  in real money demand  associated  with an increase  of $1 
billion  in real  GNP 
$0.135 billion; 
4.  See the discussion of  Frederic Mishkin's paper, "What Depressed the Con- 
sumer?  The Household Balance Sheet and the 1973-75 Recession,"  in this issue. 
5.  See Hall, "Life Cycle-Permanent  Income Hypothesis." 68  Brookings  Papers  on Economic Activity, 1:1977 
=  decrease  in real money demand  associated  with an increase  of 
100 basis  points  in  the short-term  interest  rate 
-  $2.0 billionl. 
Finally,  a preview  of the conclusions  of the rest of the paper  is needed 
to fill  in the remaining  parameters  of the IS curve.  Begin with  the capital- 
demand  function  implied  by the Cobb-Douglas  production  function, as 
derived  by  Dale W.  Jorgenson:6 
a Y 
K*  =  I  Kvs 
where  K* is the  demand  for capital  or desired  capital  stock,  Y is real  GNP, 
v is the real service  price  of capital,  and a is the elasticity  of the produc- 
tion function  with respect  to capital.  At 1977 levels, real GNP is about 
$1,325 billion and the real service price is $0.23 per $1 of capital per 
year (assuming  depreciation  of 10 percent a year). The income share 
of capital  is the usual  estimate  of a  and is 0.31. Then, under  the extreme 
assumption  of full adjustment  of actual  capital  to desired  capital  within 
a year after a policy is implemented,  the parameters  of the investment 
function  are 
y, =  accelerator effect,  -K 
= $1.36 billion of investment  per $1 billion  of GNP; 
72  =  interest-rate effect  - 
av 
O,(9v  Or 
=  $83.8  billion  per 100  basis  points. 
In the second calculation,  I have assumed  that the real service  price of 
capital  changes  point  for point with the interest  rate (Ov/Or  =  1), which 
is a close approximation. 
Table 1 presents  the derived  values of the policy effects under these 
parameter  values. The first  row maintains  the strong (and surely  incor- 
rect) assumption  of full adjustment  of capital in the first year. In this 
economy  the crude quantity  theory holds quite closely. An increase  in 
government  expenditures  of $1 billion raises GNP by only $0.2 billion; 
6. The initial statement  of Jorgenson's  theory was made in "Capital  Theory and 
Investment Behavior,"  American Economic Review, vol. 53 (May 1963), pp. 247- 
59. For a complete bibliography  of his later work with many collaborators,  see his 
"Econometric Studies of  Investment Behavior: A  Survey," Journal of  Economic 
Literature,  vol. 9 (December 1971), pp. 1111-47. Robert E. Hall  69 
Table 1. Effects on Real GNP of Monetary and Expenditure  Policies 
under Alternative  AssumptioIIs of First-Year Response of Investment 
Billions of dollars 
Effect  of increase 
of $1 billion  in  Effect of increase 
real  government  of $1 billion  in 
Assumption  about  the investment  expenditures  real  money  supply 
response  in the  first  year  ,5  A2 
Full response  to both output and 
interest  rate  0.2  8.5 
One-fourth  of both  responses  0.6  6.1 
One-half  of output response  and 
one-eighth  of interest-rate  response  1.4  7.8 
One-eighth  of both responses  0.8  4.4 
Sources: Derived from IS-LM model  using parameter values developed in the appendix and further 
explained in the text. 
the Keynesian  multiplier  effect  is almost  entirely  offset  by higher  interest 
rates  and  consequently  lower  investment.  Monetary  policy is correspond- 
ingly  potent: a $1 billion  increase  in the money  supply  depresses  interest 
rates  and  stimulates  investment  sufficiently  that  GNP rises  by $8.5 billion. 
The evidence  on lags in the investment  process  shows that  neither  the 
strong  accelerator  effect  nor the strong  interest-rate  effect  of the first  row 
describes  the modern  American  economy.  Rather,  only a fraction  of both 
responses  can take place within  a year. Jorgenson's  investment  function 
recognizes  this  lag, and  the second  row embodies  his conclusion  that  both 
responses  are  limited  in the first  year  to about  one-quarter  of the full long- 
run amount  predicted  by the capital-demand  function. The interesting 
feature  of this case is the continuing  low value of the effect  of an expen- 
diture  policy: $1 billion  in expenditures  raises  GNP by only $0.6 billion. 
The inhibiting  negative  feedback  from higher  interest  rates to lower in- 
vestment  is still substantial  even  when  considerable  sluggishness  of invest- 
ment is recognized.  Monetary  policy remains  strong: its impact  on real 
GNP is nearly  three-fourths  as large  as that  in the first  row, even though 
the direct stimulative  effects of lower interest  rates are now only one- 
quarter  as large.  The paradox  emerges  because  the sluggishness  of invest- 
ment  results  in less "crowding  out" as well as in less stimulation.  At the 
end of the paper,  I will argue  that the empirical  evidence  is fully com- 
patible  with  the economy  of the second  row.  Note the strong  disagreement 
with  the conventional  view that $1 billion  of expenditure  raises  GNP by 
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The third  row of table 1 considers  the implications  of the putty-clay 
model,  in which  the output  response  takes  place much  more  quickly  than 
the interest-rate  response.  The implied  effect of an expenditure  policy is 
quite conventional:  $1.4 billion in GNP per $1 billion of expenditure. 
This follows from the high value of the accelerator  effect and the low 
value of the inhibiting  interest-rate  effect. But monetary  policy is also 
extremely  potent  with the putty-clay  investment  function:  the effect of a 
monetary  expansion  of $1 billion is to raise GNP by $7.8 billion, only 
slightly  less than the $8.5 billion implied  by the full-adjustment  case in 
the first  row. This  implication  may cause some believers  in the putty-clay 
hypothesis  to reconsider.  It turns  out that the IS curve  for row 3 is posi- 
tively sloped. Recall that the slope of the IS curve is  (1  -  0O -  71)  /72; 
the MPC, 01, is 0.36 and the accelerator  coefficient,  /i,  is 0.68 (one-half 
of the extreme  1.36 noted  above). Then  the marginal  propensity  to spend, 
01 +  Yl, is  1.04,  so the pure Keynesian  expenditure  process is unstable 
and the expenditure  multiplier  is effectively  infinite. The interest-rate 
feedback  makes  the IS-LM model stable but the shape of the IS curve 
implies  high sensitivity  of GNP to monetary  policy. Most economists,  in- 
cluding  this writer,  will probably  reject  the possibility  that the marginal 
propensity  to spend exceeds one, but this implies  rejection  of the quick 
response  of investment  to output  associated  with  rows 1 and  3. 
The last row of table 1 shows the implications  of an even more slug- 
gish investment  function,  in which only one-eighth  of the long-run  re- 
sponse  occurs  in the first  year. As I interpret  the empirical  findings  from 
James  Tobin's  "q theory"  of investment  below, this function  is consistent 
with them. Longer  lags make expenditure  policy stronger  and monetary 
policy  weaker,  but  it is still striking  that  the effect  of a $1 billion  expendi- 
ture  on GNP, $0.8 billion,  is little more than half its conventional  value 
of $1.5 billion,  and  monetary  policy  remains  an extremely  potent  tool for 
stabilization  even  when  investment  is this unresponsive  to interest  rates. 
The rest  of the paper  investigates  the evidence  that  might  enable  one to 
choose one of the four cases of table 1 as the closest description  of the 
U.S. economy.  It begins  with  a restatement  of investment  theory  in a form 
amenable  to discussing  the  various  competing  hypotheses,  especially  putty- 
clay.  After  briefly  surveying  the evidence  on long-run  factor  substitution,  it 
turns  to the first  major  empirical  issue, the nature  of the distributed  lag 
in the investment  function. This part includes an investigation  of the 
q theory  as an alternative  way to look at lags in investment.  A discussion Robert E. Hall  71 
of the putty-clay  hypothesis follows. The commonsense  case for and 
against  putty-clay  is discussed,  and the limitations  on empirical  testing  of 
the hypothesis  mentioned.  A detailed  review  of Charles  Bischoff's  invest- 
ment function  is presented.  The general  conclusion  is that the evidence 
favors  the second  case  of table 1, but  it is not overwhelming  and  the  deter- 
mined  believer  may  understandably  remain  unswayed.  But only exception- 
ally strong  accelerator  effects  seem  to justify  conventional  views  about  the 
strength  of expenditure  policy  as a stabilization  tool. 
A Restatement  of Investment  Theory 
The usual  textbook  exposition  of the theory  of investment  has investors 
looking  deeply  into the  future  and  equating  the present  value  of the future 
marginal  product  of capital  to its acquisition  cost today. By contrast,  in 
the neoclassical  investment  function  pioneered  by Jorgenson,  which  forms 
the basis of most recent  empirical  work,  investors  need look ahead  only 
one period  and  equate  the  current  marginal  product  of capital  to its service 
cost. The relation  between  the two versions  of the theory  is a matter  of 
some confusion.  In particular,  Jorgenson's  celebrated  formula  for the ser- 
vice cost of capital  as a function  of the acquisition  cost, the depreciation 
rate, and the interest  rate  is often thought  to require  a long-term interest 
rate because  capital  is a long-lived  asset. I will argue  that this reflects  a 
misunderstanding  of the role of the interest  rate in the formula.  Further, 
Jorgenson's  formula  is frequently  attacked  as a very special  case that de- 
pends on the existence  of markets  for second-hand  capital  goods, which 
again seems to be a misunderstanding.  Finally, the literature  on invest- 
ment  theory  reflects  a great  deal of confusion  with respect  to assumptions 
about  the competitiveness  of output  markets.  In his original  development 
of the neoclassical  theory,  Jorgenson  set up the problem  as one of maxi- 
mizing  the present  value of the firm  subject  to a fixed output  price. This 
assumption  has been attacked  for its unrealism,7  but in fact the theory  can 
be restated  without  it. The central  assumption  is only that firms  produce 
at minimum  cost. 
7.  For example, Dennis Anderson, "Models for Determining Least-Cost Invest- 
ments in Electricity Supply,"  Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 
vol. 3 (Spring 1972), pp. 267-99. 72  Brookings  Papers  on Economic Activity, 1:1977 
The  restatement  makes  use of the following  notation: 
rt  =  nominal  interest  rate 
Rs t =  present  value in period  t  of one dollar  received  in 
1  1  1 
period s: R,,,  1+r,  *  +re+i  1+r=I 
P  =  price of one unit of capital equipment 
Ks =  number  of units  of new capital  installed  in period  s 
Q=  total output  to be produced  in period  s 
C8(Q,,,Ko,.  .,K8)  =  variable costs of producing in period s, given capital 
installed  in this and earlier  years 
M  =,  = marginal  value  in period  s of investment  in period  t: 
M8,  t  -  OC-/dKi. 
Total  cost is just  the present  discounted  value  of future  costs, including 
the acquisition  cost  of capital, 
co 
E  R8,  t[C8(Q8,Ko,. .,K8) +  p8K.].  a-  t 
The first-order  conditions  for a minimum  with respect to investment  in 
period t is 
00 
(1)  ,~~~~~~Rs,  tM8,  t  Pt, 
-*t 
exactly the textbook  equality  of the present  value of the future  earnings 
of today's  investment,  M8,t,  and  the current  acquisition  cost of capital,  pt. 
Before  making  use of this  version  of the cost-minimizing  condition,  the 
firm  must  form  expectations  about  the contribution  of today's  investment 
to reducing  cost in the future.  In most cases, there  is a strong  interaction 
between  the productivity  of this  year's  investment  in future  years  with  the 
productivity  of investment  made in other years. This implies that the 
equality  of the present  value of the productivity  to the acquisition  cost is 
not by itself enough to determine  this period's  cost-minimizing  level of 
investment;  the implications  of future  investment  must be kept in mind 
in evaluating  today's  investment.  In general,  complete  investment  plans 
for the future  must  be formulated  at the same  time that current  plans are 
made. 
If the interaction  among  vintages  of capital  is sufficiently  strong,  how- 
ever, there  is an important  exception  to this rule which gives rise to Jor- 
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marginal  product  of capital  to today's  rental  price.  Consider  the first-order 
condition  for  next  period's  capital, 
co 
E  Rs, tM, t+1 =R  t+, tp  t1 
8=t+I 
p t+1 
The problem  is to relate  M^,,  to M,t +,. Jorgenson  makes  the assumption 
that they have a fixed  relation  attributable  to depreciation  but otherwise 
unresponsive  to factor  intensities  or other  economic  considerations: 
Me  =  Ms,t+1/(l+3). 
Here 8 is the proportional  loss in efficiency  per period  on account  of de- 
preciation.  This assumption  makes it possible to restate the first-order 
condition  for  next  period's  capital  as 
0o  p t+  (2)  e2+  Rs, XM  t  rl  = 
Now consider  the benefits  and costs associated  with investing  one unit of 
capital  today instead of 1/(1  +  8) units next period. The benefits  are 
measured  by the difference  between  the  benefits  of the investment  in period 
1, the left-hand  side of equation  1, and the benefits  of the investment  in 
period t +  1, the left-hand  side of equation  2. Very conveniently,  the 
difference  is just the current  marginal  benefit  of capital,  M,,t. The costs 
are  measured  by the difference  between  the right-hand  side of equations  1 
and  2: 
Pt+? 
P'  (l  +r,)  (l1+6)' 
This  is the service  or rental  cost of capital  as derived  by Jorgenson-"  Then 
the  first-order  conditions  for  current  investment  can  be stated  as 
P t+i  Mtt  =-Pt -(+rt)  (1+6)' 
which  involves  no deep  look into  the future. 
The derivation  of this form of the investment  criterion  makes  it clear 
that  the service  price  of capital  depends  on the short-run interest  rate.  The 
8. Jorgenson derived his formula in continuous time as p(r +  8)  -  dp/dt  and 
then used the discrete version, pt(rt  +  8)  -  (Pt+l  -  Pt),  which is a close approxima- 
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interest  rate enters  the formula  through  the comparison  of the stream  of 
future  returns  from an investment  made today with the stream  from an 
investment  postponed  one period.  The separate  evaluation  of each stream 
involves  the long-run  interest  rate, but the comparison  does not. In Jor- 
genson's  framework,  businesses  are deciding  when  to schedule  an invest- 
ment,  and  this  decision  depends  on the short-run  interest  rate. 
This derivation  of Jorgenson's  formula  also makes it clear that the 
dependence  on the short-run  interest  rate  and  the short-run  change  in the 
price  of capital  goods  does  not rest  on any  assumption  that  investment  can 
be or is undertaken  for the short  run alone. Firms  need not be viewed as 
buying  capital  in one period  and  selling  it on a second-hand  market  in the 
next period.  The theory  does not require  the existence  of a second-hand 
market,  nor does the lack of such a market  call into question  the conclu- 
sion that the short-run  interest  rate and the rate of inflation  in prices of 
capital  goods belong  in the formula  for the service  price.  As long as the 
firm  faces an open  choice about  the scheduling  of investment,  the formula 
holds.9 
The major limiting feature of Jorgenson's theory is its implicit assump- 
tion that the relation  between the productivity  of different  vintages of 
capital is technologically  predetermined.  In particular,  this assumption 
rules  out the "putty-clay"  hypothesis,  in which  different  vintages  of capital 
are physically  distinct and embody alternative  factor intensities  deter- 
mined  at the time of installation.  Although  the general  rule remains  valid 
that investment  should  be pushed  to the point of equality  of the present 
value of the future  marginal  value of the capital  to its acquisition  cost, as 
a matter  of theory  this rule cannot  be transformed  into a simple  relation 
between  the current  marginal  value and a predetermined  rental cost of 
capital.'0 
An empirical  investment  function not based on Jorgenson's  crucial 
simplifying  assumption  appears  hopelessly  complex,  so it is useful to in- 
9.  Thus, the formula does require that the firm plans to make some investment 
in both periods. Positive gross investment  is an important  assumption  of the theory. 
It invariably holds in the aggregate, but this may conceal a fraction of firms who 
are at the corner solution of zero gross investment.  These firms will not respond to 
small changes in the short-run  interest  rate. 
10. There is always a rental price for which this simple relation is true, but in the 
general putty-clay case it will not be a predetermined  function of prices and interest 
rates. It can be derived only by solving the complete simultaneous  problem of deter- 
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quire  how well his formula  might  approximate  a technology  in which  the 
assumption  does not hold literally.  Recall that the problem  is to achieve 
Rt,tMt,t  +  Rt+i  tMj+i  t +  .. .  =  pt, 
but that  Mt+?,t  and  the other  future  marginal  values  of capital  depend  on 
future  investment.  Again, it is known  at time t that investment  decisions 
in  t +  1 will  plan  to achieve 
RtE+,  tMt+?  t+1  +  Rt+2,  tM+2,1+1  + .++ 
Two considerations  make  Mt+,,t+,  differ  from  Mt+,,t  in terms  of expecta- 
tions formed  at time t: depreciation  and obsolescence.  As long as these 
are expected  to occur  at constant  proportional  rates  in the future,  follow- 
ing Jorgenson,  a parameter,  3, easily  takes  them  into account.  Otherwise, 
it is hard  to think  of realistic  considerations  that  would lead to important 
discrepancies  between  the marginal  values  of present  and future  vintages 
of capital  in the same future  year.  If it were  known,  for example,  that  the 
relative  price  of labor  was going  to double  suddenly  five  years  from  today, 
the marginal  value of today's investment  in five years would be lower 
than a general  depreciation  formula  would predict,  and the more elab- 
orate simultaneous  model would be required.  But events like this are 
almost  never  predictable;  expectations  for the future  are  generally  smooth 
even  though  the actuality  turns  out to have sudden  changes.  As a practical 
matter,  then, a model that assumes  a simple  predetermined  relation  be- 
tween  the future  marginal  values  of different  vintages  seems  a good guide 
for investment.  In other  words,  Jorgenson's  rental  formula  is a reasonable 
starting  point for an investment  theory  even if his strong  assumption  of 
high  substitutability  of vintages  ex post  is incorrect. 
Long-Run  Substitutability  of Capital 
An early point of attack on Jorgenson's  investment  function  focused 
on his assumption  that the underlying  demand  for capital  is unit-elastic 
with respect  to the service  price of capital.  When there is only a single 
factor  other  than  capital-namely, labor-this  amounts  to assuming  that 
the elasticity  of substitution  between  capital  and  labor  is unity,  or that  the 
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of this aspect  of Jorgenson's  work." Jorgenson  replied  that a large  body 
of research  on production  functions supported  the assumption  of unit 
elasticity.'2  The controversy  ebbed  when  Charles  Bischoff  presented  evi- 
dence that the elasticity  of substitution  at the time capital equipment  is 
designed  and installed  is indeed around  one, but that capital and labor 
are less substitutable  after  installation.'3  Jorgenson  has not defended  his 
assumption of unit elasticity of substitution ex post against Bischoff's  alter- 
native view, though  there is very substantial  difference  between  the two 
views in the short run.'4  Bischoff's  evidence is scrutinized  later in this 
paper. 
The Eisner-Jorgenson  controversy  left the impression  among many 
readers  that  an unresolved  discrepancy  remained  between  time-series  and 
cross-section  evidence  on the elasticity  of substitution.  Adherents  of the 
putty-clay  hypothesis  had a ready  explanation  for this  finding,  since  cross- 
sections  ought  to reveal  the long-run  production  function  ex ante  and  time 
series  the short-run  function  ex post. However,  a recent  careful  study  of 
the time-series  evidence  by Ernst  Berndtl5 casts doubt on the existence 
of any  discrepancy  at all.  By improving  the measurement  of all the relevant 
variables,  especially  the service  price  of capital,  Berndt  obtains  estimates 
of the elasticity  of substitution  that are around  one. Errors  in variables, 
not putty-clay,  may  be the explanation  of earlier  findings  of low substitu- 
tion  in time-series  data. 
Later  in this paper  repeated  emphasis  is placed on the importance  of 
11. "Tax Policy  and Investment Behavior: Comment," American Economic 
Review, vol. 59 (June 1969), pp. 379-88; and two papers with M. I. Nadiri, "Invest- 
ment Behavior and Neo-classical Theory,"  Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 
50 (August 1968), pp. 369-82,  and "Neoclassical Theory of Investment Behavior: 
A Comment,"  Review of Economics and Statistics,  vol. 52 (May 1970), pp. 216-22. 
12. For example, in Dale W. Jorgenson, "Investment  Behavior and the Produc- 
tion Function," Bell Journal of Economics and Management  Science, vol. 3 (Spring 
1972), pp. 220-51. 
13. Charles W.  Bischoff, "Hypothesis Testing and  the  Demand for  Capital 
Goods," Review of  Economics and Statistics, vol. 51  (August 1969),  pp. 354-68; 
and Bischoff, "The Effect of Alternative Lag Distributions,"  in Gary Fromm, ed., 
Tax Incentives and Capital  Spending (Brookings  Institution, 1971), pp. 61-130. 
14. The only mention of the subject in Jorgenson's  survey article in the Journal 
of Economic Literature  is: "An important  secondary problem is the time structure 
of financial determinants  of investment;  Bischoff has suggested that real output and 
the cost of capital should have separate  lag structures  in the determination  of invest- 
ment expenditures"  ("Econometric  Studies of Investment  Behavior,"  p. 1142). 
15. Ernst Berndt, "Reconciling Alternative Estimates of  the Elasticity of  Sub- 
stitution,"  Review of Economics and Statistics,  vol. 58 (February 1976), pp. 59-68. Robert  E. Hall  77 
econometric  simultaneity  in obscuring  the true relation  between capital 
and  investment  on the one hand  and their  determinants  on the other.  The 
joint determination  of current  investment  and the current  service  price  of 
capital  is an obstacle  to measurement  of the elasticity  of substitution  from 
time series.  The supply  function  of capital  slopes upward:  both interest 
rates  and the acquisition  price  of capital  rise if demand  rises.  As in every 
econometric  study of demand,  regression  estimates  of the elasticity  of 
demand  for capital  with respect  to the service  price of capital  are biased 
toward  zero because  of the competing  influence  of the supply function. 
Berndt  attempts  to eliminate  this bias through  the use of two-stage  least 
squares,  but as usual  there  is a serious  question  about  the true  exogeneity 
of the instrumental  variables.  The direction  of the bias is unambiguous,  so 
Berndt's  evidence  strengthens  the case for a reasonably  high elasticity  of 
substitution  between  capital  and  labor. 
Today, few believers  in the short-run  inelasticity  of investment  with 
respect  to interest  rates and other determinants  of the service price of 
capital place much weight  on the lack of substitutability  of capital and 
labor  in the long run.  Rather,  the case against  the flat  IS curve  rests  on the 
three short-run  considerations  listed at the beginning  of the paper: lags 
in the investment  process,  limited  factor  substitutability  ex post, and the 
slow response  of long-term  interest  rates to changes  in short-term  rates. 
The purpose  of this brief consideration  of the evidence  on long-run  sub- 
stitutability  is simply  to guard  against  the revival  of the argument  about 
limited  long-run  substitutability  in view  of the criticisms  of the three  points 
offered  here. 
Distributed  Lags  in the  Investment  Function 
Virtually  all econometric  studies  of investment  make  use of a distributed 
lag between  changes  in the determinants  of investment  and the actual  in- 
vestment  itself.  Throughout  his work,  Jorgenson  has attributed  this lag to 
the time  required  to plan,  build, and  install  new capital  once the need for 
it is apparent.  Other  investigators  have attributed  the lag to the process 
by which expectations  of future  needs for capital are formed.  Until re- 
cently,  the distinction  between  the  two  sources  of lags  seemed  unimportant, 
but new work on the structural  interpretation  of distributed-lag  mech- 
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a great  deal.16  If policymakers  introduce  an investment  credit  today, for 
example,  there  is no reason  for  thoughtful  investors  to adjust  their  expecta- 
tions about  the future  cost of capital  according  to a distributed  lag, even 
though  the distributed  lag is a reasonable  summary  of the predictive  value 
of previous  changes  in the cost of capital  with respect  to the future  cost. 
In contrast,  there  is no reason  to think  that  the physical  process  of invest- 
ment  will take  place at a different  speed  if the investment  is a response  to 
a tax credit  rather  than any other change  in the demand  for capital.  In 
other words,  a distributed-lag  expectation  mechanism  is not a structural 
feature  of the investment  equation,  whereas  the physical  delivery  lag is 
precisely a structural  feature.  Policy analysis is now seen to require  a 
separation  of lags related  to expectations  from those of the physical  in- 
vestment  process. 
Suppose,  following  Jorgenson,  that  the process  of designing,  ordering, 
and  installing  capital  can be described  by a fixed distribution  of lags. Let 
/3i be the fraction  of capital  that can be installed  in i quarters.  Today's 
capital  stock  is thus a weighted  average  of targets  set in past quarters  on 
the  basis  of information  available  then: 
i-o 
where  K, is actual  capital  and  K'*  t  is the target  for quarter  t set in quarter 
t -  i. Note that this hypothesis  assumes  that capital  with short delivery 
lags cannot  substitute  for capital  with longer  delivery  lags, else Kt  could 
be equated  to K'  t in each  quarter.  Next, suppose  that  there  is an observed 
variable,  X,, with  the property  that  the target  capital  stock  set this quarter 
for some quarter  in the future  is equal  to the expected  value of X in the 
future  quarter: 
K*t-.  =  E  (Xt). 
t-i 
In Jorgenson's  work, X is the nominal  value of output deflated  by the 
nominal  service  cost of capital,  but the principle  discussed  here  can apply 
to a variety  of alternative  formulations  of the demand  for  capital. 
16. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Econometric  Policy Evaluation: A Critique,"  in Karl 
fBrunner  and Allan H. Meltzer, eds., The Phillips Curve  and Labor Markets (Amster- 
dam: North-Holland, 1976; distributed  in the United States and Canada  by American 
Elsevier), pp. 19-46. Lucas deals explicitly with the problems of naive expectations 
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Next, suppose  that  Xt obeys  a stationary  stochastic  process, 
xt  =  Xt  +  E  1PrUt-T. 
Here, X, is a deterministic  trend, ut  -  is a serially  uncorrelated  random 
variable,  and the  &, are lag,  weights that describe  whatever  persistence 
there  is in the movement  of X, around  its trend  over time. The random 
innovations,  u, cannot be forecast from their own past values, by hy- 
pothesis.  Under  the further  assumption  that no other  variables  known  to 
investors  in quarter  I -  i have any bearing  on the future  value of u,, the 
best forecast  of u, made in quarter  t  -  i is zero. Thus the expectation  of 
X0 formed in t -i  is 
E (Xe) =  Xt  +  E  P  TUt-T. 
Combining  the  physical  and  expectational  lags  gives 
K=  E  Pi  E  (Xt) 
i=O  t-i 
Xt  +  E 2i  E  1'TUt-T 
10  TX 
i  ~t  +  "O i 
i0'pu  t-0 




The final relationship  between  today's  capital and earlier  values of the 
innovation,  u, has the following  interpretation:  The new information  that 
became available in quarter t -  0, measured by ut-,  is expected to affect 
the demand for capital in quarter t by  fout,.  However, only those com- 
ponents  of capital  that can respond  within 0 quarters,  a fraction  BO,  are 
actually  affected  by the information,  so the  total  contribution  is Bopou-o. 80  Brookingzs  PaDers  on Economic Activity, 1:1977 
The derivation  of the distributed  lag between  Kt and  X, is much  simpli- 
fied  through  the  use of the  lag operator  notation.  Let 
co  0-0 
VjB(L) _  E  Bo'0L0. 
oo 
Then  the  process  assumed  for  X, can  be expressed  as 
X  =  t +  J(L)ut, 
and  the derived  process  for  capital  in the  presence  of delivery  lags  is 
Kt =  Xt +  iPP(L)ut. 
The implied  relation  between  X, and  K, is obtained  by eliminating  ut by 
substituting  the  first  equation  into  the  second: 
K-t =  Xt  +  VIP  (xLt  X-  xt)* 
Thus the large  body of econometric  work  that has involved  fitting  a dis- 
tributed  lag between  KY and a variable  (or composite  of variables),  Xr, 
yields a certain  combination  of the physical-lag  coefficients  and the co- 
efficients  of the process  for forming  expectations.  In general,  the lag dis- 
tribution  cannot  be interpreted  as reflecting  the physical  lags alone. In 
this respect,  Jorgenson's  discussion  of lags in the investment  process is 
incomplete. 
Some idea of the biases involved  can be gained  through  explicit  solu- 
tion of the representative  case in which  the distribution  of delivery  times  is 
second-order  Pascal,  fl- =(  1  -  p) 2is  , and  X, follows  a first-order  auto- 
regressive process with serial correlation, /:  ir  =  /t.  Then the distributed 
lag is 
Kt= x  +  ff(-Xfol 
which  is second-order  Pascal  with a decline  rate  equal  to the product,  pip, 
of the decline  rate  of the physical  distributed  lag, 8, and  the serial  correla- 
tion parameter,  ,.  The average lag is 23f/(1  -  pt),  which understates 
the average  physical  lags, 2A/(1  -  fl), provided p  is less than one. The 
casual  impression  that the combination  of a physical  lag and an expecta- 
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reason  is revealed  clearly  in the case where  X, is not serially  correlated 
at all (+ =  0). Then  earlier  fluctuations  in Xt,  are  irrelevant  for predict- 
ing capital  needs  in quarter  t, and there  is no distributed  lag at all. On the 
other  hand,  there  is one important  case in which  the observed  distributed 
lag is exactly  the same  as the distribution  of delivery  times-namely, when 
the serial-correlation  parameter,  v,  is one. Then  Xt  evolves as a random 
walk. The best predictor of X,  -  X,  at time t -  i is just Xt  -  Xyti,  so 
static expectations  are optimal.  Bischoff  has pointed out that static ex- 
pectations  underlie  his interpretation  of the distributed  lags in his invest- 
ment equation,  but apparently  considers  static expectations  a naive rule 
of thumb  and  does not investigate  whether  optimal  expectations  would  be 
very  different  from  static  expectations.'7 
Many of Jorgenson's  empirical  distributed  lags are close to second- 
order  Pascal  with a mean  lag of about  two years.  His implicit  estimate  of 
Bl>,  then, is 0.5. The implied  estimate  of p is 0.5/1,  which is different  to 
the extent  that &  differs  from  one. Following  are  two regression  estimates 
of + obtained  from  Berndt's  annual  data  on Jorgenson's  composite  capital- 
demand  variable  for  the  years  1950 through  1968: 
K*=--1.2  +  1.060 KA; 
(3.4)  (0.039) 
K*- =  5.4 +  0.928 K'i  +  0.48 t. 
(8.7)  (0.165)  (0.58) 
= 1 in 1950. 
The numbers  in parentheses  are standard  errors.  In the first regression, 
only the  lagged  value  of the variable  can explain  its trend,  so the estimated 
serial-correlation  parameter,  &,  exceeds one. The second regression  lets 
the deterministic  trend,  XT,  be a linear  function  of time, which of course 
reduces  the serial  correlation  to a value  less than  one. The first  regression 
is relevant  for appraising  the bias in a capital-demand  regression  with no 
time trend, or, equivalently,  in a net-investment  equation  with no con- 
stant.  The  second  applies  when  there  is a time  trend  or when  the  net-invest- 
ment  equation  includes  a constant.  If f is actually  1.060, as suggested  by 
the first  regression,  then the value of fi is 0.47 and the true mean of the 
physical-lag distribution is 1.79 years, not 2 years. The error is about 11 
percent  and  is easily  within  the range  of sampling  variation.  On the other 
17. "Effect  of Alternative  Lag Distributions." 82  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity.  1:1977 
hand,  if the value  of , from  the second  regression  is correct,  then  the value 
of p is 0.54 and the true  mean of the distribution  is 2.34 years.  Many of 
Jorgenson's  (and  others')  equations  included  constants,  so the second  esti- 
mate  is probably  somewhat  more  relevant  than  the first.  These  calculations 
do suggest  that the bias in the lag distributions  on account  of the role of 
the lagged  variables  in the  formation  of expectations  is not one of the most 
important  empirical  issues in investment  analysis.  Further  refinement  of 
these  calculations  is probably  not justified  in view  of the  potentially  serious 
problems  caused  by simultaneity  of the right-hand  variables  in investment 
regressions,  a topic  to which  I now  turn. 
IMPLICATIONS  OF  THE  ENDOGENEITY  OF  OUTPUT 
There is one important  further  obstacle to measurement  of the dis- 
tributed  lag in the investment  equation:  the econometric  problems  posed 
by the endogeneity  of the major  right-hand  variables  in an investment 
equation.18  Endogeneity  arises  from two sources.  First, the random  dis- 
turbance  in the investment  function  feeds back through  the expenditure 
process  to influence  output  and the interest  rate. An upward  shift in the 
investment  function  raises  GNP and the interest  rate in much the same 
way as an increase  in government  expenditures  does. A regression  of in- 
vestment  on output  and  the interest  rate (or a service  price  of capital  that 
depends  on the interest  rate) will tend to overstate  the positive effect of 
output  and  understate  the  negative  effect  of the  interest  rate. 
The second, more serious,  source  of endogeneity  arises  from the cor- 
relation  of the  disturbance  in the  investment  function  with  the disturbances 
in the other  major  structural  equations  of the economy.  Unmeasured  in- 
fluences  associated  with the arrival  of favorable  or unfavorable  informa- 
tion shift  the investment  function  and also shift the other  determinants  of 
GNP and of the interest  rate.  Again,  the likely  pattern  is positive  correla- 
18. Some authors have argued beyond the econometric difficulty  to say that an 
equation with, for example, output  on the right-hand  side is somehow logically defec- 
tive because output is determined  jointly with investment;  see, for example, John P. 
Gould, "The Use  of  Endogenous Variables in Dynamic Models of  Investment," 
Quarterly  Journal of Economics, vol. 83 (November 1969), pp. 580-99. This line of 
argument appears to involve a misunderstanding  of the notion of a structural  equa- 
tion. For a more complete discussion, see Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson, 
"Tax Policy and Investment Behavior: Reply and Further Results,"  American Eco- 
nomic Review, vol. 59 (June 1969), pp. 388-401. Robert E. Hall  83 
tion of output, the interest  rate, and the disturbance  in the investment 
equation.  Here, too, a regression  will overstate  the effect of output on 
investment  and  understate  the  effect  of the  interest  rate. 
In principle,  econometric  techniques  are available  for recovering  the 
true structural  investment  lag in the presence  of the correlation  of the 
right-hand  variables  and  the disturbance  in the  investment  equation.  These 
techniques  rely on instrumental  variables  that are independent  of the dis- 
turbance.  However,  the logic of the investment  equation-that  today's 
investment  is the realization  of plans  made  one, two, or three  years  ago- 
rules out the most fruitful  source  of instruments-namely,  lagged  endog- 
enous  variables  such  as GNP in earlier  quarters.  Apart  from  demographic 
trends and variations  in the weather,  the only admissible  instrumental 
variables  for the investment  equation  are truly exogenous  measures  of 
macroeconomic  policy.  Whether  such  measures  with  any power  as instru- 
ments  exist  is doubtful. 
Though  the prospects  for estimating  the investment  equation  through 
two-stage  least squares  are not entirely  favorable,  the previous  analysis 
does suggest  a useful test for endogeneity  of the right-hand  variables  in 
an investment  equation.  The investment  equation  relates  investment  to the 
first  difjerences  of GNP while  the correlation  of GNP and  the disturbance 
may generate  an apparent  relation  between  investment  and the level of 
GNP. Then the observed  distributed  lag between  investment  and GNP is 
useful in the following  respect:  If the sum of the lag coefficients  is zero, 
then  the observed  relation  actually  depends  on the first  differences  of GNP 
and may actually  be the true investment  equation.  If the sum is unam- 
biguously  positive,  then  it is impossible  that  the estimated  lag distribution 
is the true distribution.  In other  words,  a finding  that the level of invest- 
ment  depends  on the level of GNP invalidates  any claim that the relation 
is an investment equation alone.'19 
The problems  of endogeneity  are  further  compounded  in cases  in which 
separate  distributed  lags are fitted  to the influences  of real output  and of 
the relative  service  cost of capital,  notably  in the work of Bischoff.  The 
bias from the endogeneity  of the right-hand  variables  probably  is most 
severe  in the contemporaneous  part of the distributed  lags. Then the lag 
distribution  for output  will exaggerate  the accelerator  effect in the short 
19. All of this applies as stated to net, not gross, investment.  When the proposed 
test is applied to data on gross investment later in the paper, the test is suitably 
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run  and  that  for the service  price  will understate  its true  effect  in the short 
run. There  is a clear  bias in the regression  away  from the simpler  model 
in which the responses  to the two variables  are equal in magnitude  and 
opposite  in sign.  Again, a useful  test for endogeneity  is based  on the gen- 
eral prediction  of investment  theory  that the level of output  has no influ- 
ence  on net  investment.  If level effects  are  revealed  by the regression,  there 
is a presumption  against  its interpretation  as a pure  structural  investment 
equation. 
EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE  ON  THE  DISTRIBUTED  LAG 
Many authors  have fitted  distributed  lags between  investment  and its 
determinants.20  Except  for a number  of studies  with obvious  econometric 
problems  associated  with the use of Koyck distributed  lags without  cor- 
rection  for serial  correlation,  there is remarkably  close agreement  about 
the basic features  of the lag functions.  They are smooth, hump-shaped 
distributions  with an average  lag of about  two years. Within  the general 
class of flexible  accelerator  investment  models, this conclusion  seems to 
hold over  quite  wide  variations  in the specification  of the demand  function 
for capital and in the econometric  method  used to estimate  the lag dis- 
tributions.2'  Of course, all of this evidence  is subject  to the potentially 
serious  bias  from  endogeneity  discussed  earlier.  Though  some  studies  have 
used  simultaneous  estimation  techniques,  none to my knowledge  has come 
to grips  with  the basic  obstacle  that  the logic of the distributed-lag  invest- 
ment function makes any lagged endogenous  variable ineligible as an 
instrument  unless  it is lagged  more  than  the  most  distant  part  of the invest- 
ment lag distribution.  Two features  of investment  functions  of the type 
fitted  by Jorgenson  may reduce  this bias, but there  is no reason to think 
they eliminate  it: First, his constraint  that output  and the rental  price of 
20.  Many of these are summarized  by Jorgenson,  "Econometric  Studies  of Invest- 
ment Behavior."  I will not discuss the equally large body of evidence on the lag be- 
tween appropriations  or new orders and the determinants  of investment.  Though this 
lag is free from pure delivery lags, it includes many of the planning stages that I 
include in a full description  of the investment process. Throughout the paper, "de- 
livery lags" is a short-hand  term for all of the time-consuming  steps in investment. 
21.  For example, the more refined  version  of my own work with Jorgenson  which 
used the modern Almon lag technique and made a full correction for serial correla- 
tion certainly fits within this general summary; see Robert E. Hall and Dale W. 
Jorgenson, "Application of  the  Theory of  Optimum Capital Accumulation," in 
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capital enter as a ratio offsets the positive bias associated  with the cor- 
relation  of GNP and  the disturbance  with  the negative  bias associated  with 
the correlation  of the interest  rate and the disturbance.  Second,  his con- 
straint  that  the level of the demand  for capital  has no permanent  effect  on 
net investment  probably  reduces  the bias caused  by the correlation  of the 
level of GNP with  the disturbance.  The  review  below  of Bischoff's  work  in 
which both of these constraints  are dropped  suggests  that they have a 
major  influence. 
In addition  to the somewhat  questionable  econometric  evidence  about 
lags  in investment,  there  is an important  body  of survey  evidence  collected 
by Thomas  Mayer,22  which  has  been  cited  extensively  by Jorgenson.  Mayer 
finds  that  the average  lag between  the decision  to undertake  an investment 
project  and  the completion  of it is about  twenty-one  months.  To this  must 
be added  any lag that occurs  between  the arrival  of information  that in- 
vestment  is needed and the decision  to carry  out the investment.  As Jor- 
genson  argues,  Mayer's  evidence  seems  perfectly  consistent  with modern 
econometric  findings  about  the  lag  distribution. 
This evidence  on lags in investment  confirms  the view that they are a 
major  limitation  in the response  of investment  to changes  in interest  rates 
and  other  determinants  of the service  price  of capital,  and  thus an impor- 
tant  influence  in making,  the IS curve  steeper  than  it would  be if investment 
responded  quickly  to its determinants.  Any realistic  model  for the analysis 
of stabilization  policies  must  incorporate  a serious  consideration  of these 
lags. 
TOBIN'S  "Q  THEORY"  OF  INVESTMENT 
The major  competitor  to Jorgenson's  theoretical  framework  for invest- 
ment  has been created  by James  Tobin.23  Tobin  observes  that  unexpected 
changes  in the demand  for capital  generate  discrepancies  between  the cur- 
rent  market  value  of existing  installed  capital  and the cost of reproducing 
22.  "Plant and Equipment Lead Times," Journal of Business, vol.  33  (April 
1960), pp. 127-32. 
23. Tobin's thinking on the subject  considerably  predates  Jorgenson's,  of course. 
Two recent fairly complete expositions are James Tobin, "A General Equilibrium 
Approach to  Monetary Theory," Journal of  Money, Credit, and Banking, vol.  1 
(February 1969), pp. 15-29,  and Tobin "Asset Markets and the Cost of Capital" 
(with William Brainard), Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 427 (March 1976), 
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that capital. The ratio between the two is his famous "q." It is essential to 
understand  the relation  between  the two theories  in order  to interpret  the 
empirical  evidence  obtained  by the disciples of the two major figures, 
especially  because  Tobin  and  his followers  generaliy  seem  to view the lags 
in the investment  process  as extremely  lengthy.  So far as I know,  the litera- 
ture  does  not  contain  a reconciliation  of the  two  theories. 
Tobin cites two reasons  for q to depart  from unity. First, lags in de- 
livering  capital  goods  generate  transitory  departures.  Second,  costs of in- 
vestment  that rise more than proportionately  to the rate of investment 
bring  about  both  transitory  and  permanent  departures.  I propose  to ignore 
the second  consideration.  Adjustment  costs and  delivery  lags are  probably 
best viewed as alternative  explanations  of the lagged  response  of invest- 
ment  to its determinants.  A model  containiing  both would  be complex  and 
redundant. 
If delivery  lags are the only obstacle  to instant  fulfillment  of the basic 
condition  that the present  value of the future  marginal  contributions  of 
capital  equal  its current  acquisition  cost, then q departs  from one only to 
the extent  that capital  already  in place is now expected  to yield more or 
less than it was expected  to at the time of installation.  That is, qt -  1 is 
the present  value at time t of the extra  rent attributable  to recent  unex- 
pected  events.  This  rent  will be earned  only over  the period  during  which 
capital  cannot  be adjusted.  A simple  model of this process  is the follow- 
ing: As before,  let Ki,t be the stock of capital  with delivery  lag i, and let 
Xt be the stock that would be held today if there  were no delivery  lag. 
Suppose  that  the excess  rent  in real terms  is a simple  multiple  of the gap, 
X(Xt  -  K-  t).  Then today's  qt for capital  of type i is, in the absence  of 
discounting, 
W+-1 
qi,t -  I  =  -  E(X  -Ki). 
8t  G 
Note that  no excess rents  are expected  after  t + i -  1, since in t -+ i and 
beyond,  the capital  stock  will be adjusted  today  to eliminate  any expected 
gap. Suppose  that capital  demand  consists  of a deterministic  trend,  Xt, 
plus a residual  that  is approximately  a random  walk.  Then static  expecta- 
tions are  appropriate  for the residual,  and  the expected  future  value  of the 
demand  is the  sum  of the  future  trend  and  the  current  residual: 
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Now the current  anld  future  values  of Ki,t were  based on expectations  of 
Xt formed  by the  same  process  in past  quarters: 
Ki,8  =  -8  +  (X8,-i-Xs_0. 
Putting these into the formula for qi,t gives 
t?i-1 
qi, t -  1 =  Xi(Xt  -  Xt)  -  X E  (Xs-i-  1.-0.  8-t 
The first  term  is today's  expectation  of the total future  excess rent if the 
capital stock remains  at its present  level and the second adjusts  for in- 
vestment  commitments  made  in the recent  past  that  will be installed  within 
the  next  i quarters. 
Taking  the weighted  average  of the qi,t over  the delivery-time  distribu- 
tion,  p3i,  gives  the general  formula  for  qt: 
qg  1 =  iqi,t-  1 
=  (Xt  -  -t)X  (1-Bo)Xt-. 
0=0 
Here y is the first  moment  or mean  lag of the pl-distribution  and  B0 is, as 
before,  the fraction  of capital  with delivery  lags of 0 or less. Again, the 
second  term  adjusts  for the future  investment  already  in the pipeline. 
The next step is to combine  this model of the determination  of qt with 
the earlier  model  of investment.  First,  define 
X(L)  =  Xi-X  X2(I  -  Bo)LO; 
thus 
q-  =  X(L)  (Xt  -  t) 
Recall  that 
K  =  f3(L)  (Xt -  Xt)  +  Xt, 
so there is, in fact, a relation between Kt and qt as posited by Tobin: 
Kt  = X(L)  (q  t  1) +  fct. 
Tlhe  lag between  q and K is not the distribution  of delivery  times, P(L). 
In fact, in one important  case, the relationship  turns  out to be a purely 
contemporaneous  one between  qt and the first  difference  of Kt, which  is 
simply  net investment.  Suppose  the distribution  of delivery  times is geo- 
metric: 
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Then 
1(1  )2  1  (t-1)  + 
or 
AKt  1(qt  1)+  +  )X. 
This is exactly the equation  proposed  by Tobin; it is an implication  of 
Jorgenson's  model  under  static  expectations  and a geometric  distribution 
of delivery  times. 
A careful empirical  investigation  of the q theory has recently been 
carried  out  by John  Ciccolo.24  Working  with  a variety  of concepts,  he finds 
a statistically  unambiguous  relation  between investment  and empirical 
measures  ol q. In all of his regressions,  the dependent  variable  is gross 
investment  divided  by the  capital  stock,  and  q enters  with  an unconstrained 
distributed  lag. The sum  of the lag coefficients  varies  from  a low value of 
0.033, when  aggregate  fixed  investment  from  the  national  income  accounts 
is the dependent  variable,  to 0.1322, when new orders  for equipment  is 
the dependent  variable.  In a pair  of regressions  in which  fixed  investment 
is broken  into structures  and equipment,  the sum is 0.052 for structures 
and 0.124 for equipment.  Tobin has summarized  Ciccolo's findings  by 
stating  0.08 as a reasonable  estimate  of the sum of the lag coefficients, 
which  seems  entirely  fair.  With  respect  to the nature  of the  lag distribution, 
Ciccolo invariably  obtains  fairly short distributions,  with means in the 
range  from  two to four  quarters.  Although  the  hypothesis  that  the  relation 
is purely  contemporaneous  is rejected,  the simple  model  with a geometric 
distribution  of delivery  times is a reasonably  good approXimation  to the 
underlying  distributed  lag,  which  turns  out  to be fairly  long. 
Interpretation  of Ciccolo's  results  requires  an assumption  about  X.  Re- 
call  that  his regression  has  the  form 
I-y(L)(q  -1)  + 
where  X  is the derivative  of the real  service  price  with  respect  to the capital 
stock.  As Tobin suggests,  a first  guess about  the elasticity  of the relation 
is unity,  as implied  by a Cobb-Douglas  production  function.  Since  the real 
24. John H. Ciccolo, Jr., "Four Essays on Monetary Policy" (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Yale University, 1975); and Ciccolo, "Money, Equity Values, and Income-Tests 
for Exogeneity," Working Paper (Boston College, Department of Economics, n.d.; 
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service  price  is around  0.06 at quarterly  rates,  the implied  value of XK  is 
the same  0.06 under  unit  elasticity.  Now approximate  Ciccolo's  short  dis- 
tributed  lag y(L)  by the sum of its coefficients,  say yo  0.08. Then an 
estimate  of the parameter  of the underlying  geometric  lag distribution  is 
available  from 
1  (l1-gi'2 
The  result  is p =  0.966. The mean  of the geometric  distribution  is twenty- 
eight quarters,  or seven years; 13 percent  or just over one-eighth  of the 
adjustment  to a change  in the desired  capital  stock  takes  place in the first 
four  quarters.  Taking  account  of the short  distributed  lag found  by Ciccolo 
would  reduce  this  fraction  somewhat,  but  this  would  be offset  by the oppo- 
site  bias  to be discussed  shortly. 
Ciccolo's  results  seem to confirm  the q theorists'  view that investment 
is a sluggish  process.  This sluggishness  applies  both to the accelerator  re- 
sponse  to changes  in output  and to the response  of investment  to changes 
in interest  rates.  Recall from  table 1 that the effect  of expenditure  policy 
is still  remarkably  weak  even if only an eighth  of the adjustment  of capital 
occurs  in the first  year.  In that  case, $1 billion  in expenditure  raises  GNP 
by only $0.8 billion.  Monetary  policy  is correspondingly  strong. 
The major  conclusion  of this  paper-that there  is a real  possibility  that 
expenditure  policy  is nowhere  near  as potent  as most  economists  believe- 
survives  complete  acceptance  of the evidence  of the q theory.  However, 
there  is one important  reason  to expect a bias in Ciccolo's  results  toward 
an overstatement  of the length  of the investmerit  lag. In the q theory,  slug- 
gishness  of investment  is inferred  from  the low value  of the coefficient  (or 
sum of coefficients)  of q in the investment  equation.  To the extent that 
the empirical  measure  of q in an investment  regression  contains  important 
measurement  errors,  a familiar  principle  of econometric  theory  holds that 
its coefficient  will be biased  downward  as an estimate  of the true relation 
between  q and  the  rate  of investment.  Ciccolo  infers  q fromll  imperfect  data 
on corporate  valuations;  neither  the value of stocks  nor the value of debt 
is measured  directly  for the sectors  for which  he has investment  data.  He 
infers  the valuation  by discounting  dividend  and interest  flows by price- 
dividend  ratios  and market  yields  for much  narrower  sectors.  In the case 
of debt  especially,  this  procedure  is bound  to introduce  significant  random 
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inability  to measure  q specifically  for capital  goods.  The market  valuation 
of the corporate  sector  upon which Ciccolo relies is the value of every- 
thing owned by corporations,  not just their physical  capital. Intangible 
capital,  natural  resources,  goodwill,  monopoly  position,  and firm-specific 
human  capital  all contribute  to the market  value of a firm.  They cause 
important  fluctuations  in the measured  q that  are  irrelevant  for investment 
in physical  capital.  Again, these bias downward  the coefficient  of q in an 
investment  regression.  On this account,  the length of the underlying  in- 
vestment  lag inferred  from  Ciccolo's  regression  ought  to be treated  as an 
upper  bound.  Of course,  Jorgenson's  approach  to measuring  the invest- 
ment  lag is also biased  by measurement  error,  though  the direction  of the 
bias is less clear. Within  models of the Jorgenson-Tobin  class, in which 
output  and interest  rates affect  investment  with the same lag, it appears 
that somewhere  between 10 percent  and 30 percent  of the ultimate  ad- 
justment  of capital  takes place within the first year after a stabilization 
policy  takes  effect. 
The Putty-Clay  Hypothesis 
The putty-clay  hypothesis  has a central  role in investment  theory.25 
Under  strict  putty-clay,  the supply  of output  from existing  capital  is un- 
responsive  to the service  price  of capital;  a stimulus  to investment  operat- 
ing through  interest  rates, for example, affects only the investment  to 
increase  output  and  does  not cause  substitution  toward  less labor-intensive 
use of the existing  capital.  Of course,  there  is a continuous  range  of alter- 
natives  between  strict  putty-clay  and  the  putty-putty  case  in which  installed 
capital  is just as flexible  as new capital.  The issue is to decide where  in 
this  range  the best description  of the substitution  possibilities  of a modern 
economy  lies. 
25.  Leif Johansen  originally  proposed  the hypothesis  in "Substitution  versus  Fixed 
Production Coefficients  in the Theory of Economic Growth: A Synthesis,"  Econo- 
metrica,  vol. 27 (April 1959), pp. 157-76. Apparently,  Edmund  Phelps is responsible 
for the misunderstanding  of the physical properties  of the two substances  that gave 
rise to the name of the hypothesis.  What is called the putty-clay hypothesis ought to 
be the clay hypothesis (malleable ex ante and hard ex post)  and the putty-putty 
alternative should be simply the putty technology. But it is too late to inflict this 
rationalization  of the terminology on the reader, and I will perpetuate  Phelps' blun- 
der. A bibliography  of other contributions  appears in Christopher  Bliss, "On Putty- 
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IMPLICATIONS  FOR  INVESTMENT  THEORY 
One task  of investment  theory  not undertaken  by Jorgenson  is to inte- 
grate  the putty-clay  hypothesis  into the theory.  I have argued  earlier  that 
Jorgenson's  rental  formula  and  the attending  principle  that today's  inves- 
ment should proceed to the point of equality  of the marginal  value of 
capital to the rental  price are good approximations  even outside of the 
strict  assumptions  of his model,  but  even  so the complete  investment  equa- 
tion embodying  the putty-clay  hypothesis  is quite different.  The inability 
to vary  the  labor  intensity  of existing  vintages  of capital  limits  the response 
of investment  to changes  in the relative  price of capital,  even though  the 
response  is exactly  described  by Jorgenson's  principle. 
Suppose  that the technology  for today's  vintage  of capital  is described 
by its full cost function, QNyt, where QN  is the level of output to be pro- 
duced  with  new capital  and  /t  is the average  and  marginal  cost at today's 
wage  and  rental  price  of capital.  On the other  hand,  the variable  costs for 
producing  on existing  vintages  of capital  are 
C?t(Q?,Kjj  ... .,Kt-1). 
Here Q? is the level of output  to be produced  using existing  capital,  and 
K1,..  .,  Kt-l  are quantities of capital of vintages 1 through t -  1. The 
dependence  of cost on the prices of variable  factors,  especially  labor, is 
incorporated  simply  through  the time subscript  of the cost function.  Pre- 
sumably,  to the extent  that  the putty-clay  hypothesis  holds, this cost func- 
tion shows sharply  rising  marginal  cost at some level of output  identified 
as the capacity  of the existing  capital  stock.  The overall  cost function  (ex- 
cept  for  the  irrelevant  fixed  costs  of the existing  capital)  is 
Ct(Q,Ki,... ,Kt_)  =  min  [C'(Q,K1,...  ,Kt-1) +  Q tt]. 
Qt  +  Q? =  Q 
The minimum  of total cost occurs  at an allocation  of output  between  old 
and new capital  that equates  the marginal  cost on each. Since marginal 
cost on new vintages  is the predetermined  constant,  /t,  this means that 
output  on the old capital  is pushed  to the point  at which  the marginal  vari- 
able  cost equals  the total marginal  cost of producing  on new capital.  Thus 
Qt is determined  by 
aC?  t 
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which  can be solved  explicitly  for Q?: 
Q? =  S?t(pt,Ki,  ... jKt_j)j 
where  S? is the supply  function  for output on old vintages,  in the sense 
that  Q?  would  be the supply  of a competitive  firm  that  had  capital  K1,  .... 
Kt-l but no new capital,  selling  in a market  for output  with price  Itt.  Of 
course,  nothing  in this analysis  deals with the output  market  and no as- 
sumption  of competition  is required  for  what  follows. 
All output  not produced  on old capital  is produced  by investing  in new 
capacity: 
Q7 =  Qt -St(AtjKj,...Kt_j). 
Suppose  that  the optimal  capital-output  ratio  for new capacity  is pt.  Then 
investment is  QNpt  and the  final putty-clay investment function is 
achieved: 
Kt =  (Qt -  Q9)O3t 
=  [Qt -  St(tK,...Kt_,)]ot. 
The response  of investment  to changes  in the rental  price  of capital  v has 
two  components: 
-Kt  =  QN  dAt OS_  S 9  t 
OVt  t  Ovt  O/.Lt  Ovt 
Both  terms  are  negative.  The  first  says  that  an increase  in the cost of capital 
decreases  the capital  intensity  of the new capacity;  this effect is propor- 
tional to the amount  of new capacity,  as measured  by Qt. The second 
term  says that  high capital  costs raise the marginal  cost of producing  on 
new capital and therefore  induce higher  output on the existing capital. 
The magnitude  of the second term depends  on the output elasticity  of 
marginal  cost on old capital.  Under  the strict  putty-clay  hypothesis,  under 
which  existing  capital  has absolutely  fixed capacity,  the second term  dis- 
appears.  The conclusion  follows  that  the response  of investment  to interest 
rates  and  taxes  is weak  in the short  run  because  the response  applies  only 
to the small  amount  of output  produced  on new capital,  as emphasized  by 
Bischoff.  On the other  hand, if more output  can be squeezed  out of old 
capital  by incurring  higher  costs, then the second term  may be important 
as  well. 
The prior  case for limited  substitutability  ex post is based on the plau- 
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set of alternatives  than  the users  of the capital  after  the designer  has made 
a specific  choice and  the equipment  is installed.  In the extreme,  designers 
decide  how many  work  stations,  how many  electric  motors,  and  so on, are 
required  to accomplish  a certain  purpose,  and  the installed  facility  cannot 
operate  without  the specified  labor and electrical  input and cannot use 
extra  labor  or electricity.  The view that  most capital  has this characteristic 
underlies  the belief  that  the strict  putty-clay  hypothesis  is a good approxi- 
mation  to reality,  though  none  would  argue  that  it is absolutely  precise. 
There  is an equally  strong  prior  case against  the hypothesis.  The idea 
that  most of the cooperation  between  labor and capital  takes  the form of 
workers  tending  machines  in a routine  way specified  by the designer  of the 
machine  describes  only a small  and  shrinking  sector  of a modern  economy. 
In 1973, only 13 percent  of the U.S. labor  force were  classified  as opera- 
tors of machines  (other  than vehicles).  The modern  electronic  computer 
is a good example  of the case in which  few important  decisions  about  the 
relation  between  capital and labor are made irrevocably  at the time of 
design.  Every  user  of a computer  makes  choices  constantly  about  the sub- 
stitution  of the computer's  services  for human  effort.  When  an investment 
credit or other influence  makes computer  services cheaper,  computers 
become  cost effective  in tasks  that had been at the margin.  For this sub- 
stitution,  existing  computers  are  just  as good as new ones.  More  generally, 
the observation  that the number  of workers  tending  a machine  is largely 
predetermined  by the designer  does not establish  the putty-clay  hypothe- 
sis, since the important  dimension  of substitution  may be between the 
machine  and  its crew and  labor  that  cooperates  without  working  at a sta- 
tion  on the machine.  In the example  of the computer,  the kind  of substitu- 
tion ex post that refutes the putty-clay  hypothesis  is not between the 
computer  and  its operators,  but  between  the package  of the computer  and 
operators,  and  all of the  workers  involved  in handling  data  in an  enterprise. 
Beyond  the general  objection  that  the putty-clay  hypothesis  has an ex- 
cessively  narrow  view of the opportunities  for substitution  ex post, there 
is one rather  specific  objection  that is fatal to the hypothesis  even as an 
approximation  to reality.  One of the most important  dimensions  of factor 
substitution  is variations  in the annual  hours  of operation  of capital.  The 
labor  required  for the marginal  hour of operation  must usually  be paid a 
weekend  or shift differential,  so often capital  is used for fewer than the 
8,760 hours  in a year.  When  capital  becomes  cheaper,  its optimal  annual 
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labor  has occurred.  In particular,  the price  elasticity  of supply  on existing 
vintages  of capital,  identified  in the earlier  theoretical  discussion  as the 
crucial  aspect  of the putty-clay  hypothesis  from the point of view of in- 
vestment  theory,  is potentially  high if shift differentials  for labor are not 
too large  and  if not too high  a fraction  of the capital  stock  is at the corner 
solution  of full-time  operation. 
Robert Lucas has developed  a complete analytical  treatment  of the 
production  possibilities  in an economy  with  variable  hours  of capital  uti- 
lization.26  He points out that  variations  in hours can give a theoretically 
sound  explanation  of three  puzzling  facts  about  the  U.S. economy: (1) the 
unit elasticity  of employment  with  respect  to output  in the short  run; (2) 
the cyclical  stability  of real  wages;  and (3) the astonishing  level of output 
achieved  at the peak of World  War II, far above the limit suggested  by 
any simple  production  function.  The theory  explains  the proportional  re- 
lation  between  labor  input  and real output  as reflecting  variations  in the 
annual  hours  of operation  of the existing  capital  stock. The theory  does 
not have  a definite  prediction  about  the behavior  of the average  real  wage 
(averaged  across  workers  paid  regular  wages  for the first  shift  and  a higher 
wage  at other  times), but  constancy  is perfectly  compatible  with  it. Finally, 
World  War  II was  a period  of peak  utilization  of almost  all types  of capital. 
This  level of utilization  was economically  efficient  only under  the extreme 
conditions  of the  war,  and  would  never  be reproduced  by the private  econ- 
omy  in normal  periods. 
All in all, superficial  arguments  in favor of the putty-clay  hypothesis 
do not survive  careful  scrutiny.  Higher  prices may well bring  forth sub- 
stantial  additional  output  from the existing  capital,  and this refutes  strict 
putty-clay  even as an approximation.  The question  becomes  an empirical 
one, with  no strong  prior  in favor  of putty-clay.  So far as I know,  the con- 
nection between  the behavior  of marginal  cost in the short run and the 
putty-clay  hypothesis  has not been exploited  in empirical  work, though 
it seems  a promising  approach.  The only full-scale  empirical  investigation 
of the  hypothesis  in which  it is testable  rather  than  maintained  is in Charles 
Bischoff's  work  on investment,  to which  I now  turn. 
BISCHOFF  'S  INVESTMENT  EQUATION 
In a series  of important  papers,  Charles  Bischoff  has fitted  an invest- 
ment  function  in which  different  distributed  lags apply  to real output  and 
26.  Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Capacity,  Overtime, and Empirical Production Func- 
tions," American Economic Review, vol. 60 (May 1970), pp. 23-27. Robert E. Hall  95 
to the service  price of capital.27  One of his principal  motives  was to test 
the putty-clay  hypothesis,  which  he interpreted  as predicting  a longer  lag 
between  changes  in the service  price  and  the  response  of investment,  com- 
pared  with  the lag for changes  in output.  His results  show a strong  asym- 
metry  in the two responses  and have been widely  cited as confirming  the 
putty-clay  hypothesis.  Representative  results  from  Bischoff's  work  appear 
in table 2.28 To interpret  his findings  calls first for understanding  the 
implications  of the use of gross  investment  as the dependent  variable.  Sup- 
pose for simplicity  that  the capital  stock is related  by a distributed  lag to 
a variable,  Xt, that  indexes  the demand  for capital: 
Kt  E  oiXt_1. 
i=O 
Now gross investment  is the sum of net investment  Kt -  Ktl  and de- 
terioration,  8Kt-l: 
It  = K  -  (1 -6)Kt1; 
so a function  for  gross  investment  is 
It =  2  i[Xt  -  (I -6)Xt-i-1]. 
The analog  of Bischoff's  procedure  for this simple  model  would  be to fit a 
distributed  lag to the levels of Xt: 
It =  Xt_i. 
The  lag  parameters  ,/3  and  ,1 are  related  by 
i'=  i-  (1  -a)i 
However,  the level form is more general  in one central  respect: in the 
difference  form,  the function  is constrained  so that  net investment  depends 
only  on the  first  differences  and  not on the long-run  level of demand,  while 
in the level form this basic conclusion  of investment  theory can be vio- 
27.  "Hypothesis  Testing and the Demand for Capital Goods"; "Effect  of Alterna- 
tive Lag Distributions";  and Charles  W. Bischoff, "Business  Investment  in the 1970s: 
A Comparison  of Models,"  BPEA, 1:1971, pp. 13-58. 
28.  I calculated these from the data in the appendix to his paper, "Effect of 
Alternative Lag Distributions."  They do not agree exactly with any of Bischoff's 
published results, but the difference is unimportant.  In the process of this work, I 
verified Bischoff's claim that his findings are extremely robust with respect to the 
choice of lag specification.  Even specifications  that take a very different  approach  to 
fitting  separate  lags for output and the service  price of capital showed the same strong 
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Table 2.  Bischoff's Investment  Function in Level and Difference Form 
Equations 
2.1  Level  forma 
11  11 
it  'Vtei  Qt-i  +  7A  Vtii  Q _i 
,B=  -0.165  yA =  0.177 
(0.026)  (0.026) 
2  0.9918  standard error = 0.637 
2.2  Difference  forms 
10 
it  =  I Sit  V_i  Q t-i  -(1  -)  t_iiQ  t-i-l 
i=o 
10 
+>  'Yi[Vt-i_1Q  t-i-(I  -  6) Vt-i2Qt-i-11 
i=o 
gi  =  -0.465  EYi  =  0.604 
(0.140)  (0.138) 
k2  = 0.9215  standard error  1.972 
Lag coefficients 
Level  form, 2.1  Difference  form, 2.2 
Service-price  Service-price 
Lag  Output  effect,  effect,  Output  effect,  effect, 
(quarters)  ,B '+ y  ,B' +  1Y-I  f3i +  yi  13i +  Yi-1 
0  0.012  -0.002  0.019  -0.010 
1  0.008  -0.001  0.009  0.008 
2  0.004  0.001  0.003  0.002 
3  0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.002 
4  -0.001  0.002  -0.003  0.004 
5  -0.002  0.002  -0.003  0.004 
6  -0.002  0.002  -0.003  0.006 
7  -0.002  0.002  -0.001  0.006 
8  -0.001  0.003  0.002  0.005 
9  -0.001  0.002  0.011  0.004 
10  -0.001  0.001  0.002  0.006 
11  -0.003  -0.001  -0.016  -0.008 
12  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.022 
Sources: The lag coefficients are representative results calculated from  data in Charles W. Bischoff, 
"The Effect of Alternative Lag Distributions," in Gary Fromm, ed., Tax Incentives  and Capital  Spending 
(Brookings Institution, 1971), pp. 128-30. 
a.  It = gross investment; Vt  inverse of real service price of capital; Qt = real output; a =  quarterly 
depreciation rate, assumed to be 0.04. Standard errors are in billions of 1958 dollars. 
lated.  In terms  of the  lag parameters,  8B  of the level form,  this  restriction  is 
2 (1-  -ig' =  Q. 
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standard  techniques.  If it is rejected  in favor of a positive value of the 
weighted  sum,  then  net investment  depends  on the level of the demand  for 
capital  even in the long run, and the equation  cannot  be called an invest- 
ment  function.  Again,  the obvious  interpretation  of this finding  is that  the 
disturbance  in the investment  equation  is correlated  with the right-hand 
variables. 
As the equations  in table 2 show, Bischoff actually  fits separate  dis- 
tributed  lags to composite  variables  that are the products  of his relative 
price of capital  services,  Vt, which contains  the service  price in the de- 
nominator,  and real output, Qt. In this case, in order to qualify as an 
investment  function,  both sets of distributed-lag  coefficients  should  satisfy 
the constraint;  in other words, Bischoff's  investment  equation  ought to 
look like equation  2.2. The  results  in table  2 show  that  Bischoff's  equation 
is devastated  by the constraint  that it be a genuine  investment  equation. 
The unexplained  residual  variance  rises by a factor of more than nine, 
from  less than  1 percent  to almost  8 percent.29  The  problem  with  Bischoff's 
equation  can be seen in the first two columns  at the bottom of table 2, 
where  the separate  influence  of output  and  the service  price of capital  are 
computed  for the unconstrained  equation.  Most of the positive  effect of 
output  is in the contemporaneous  quarter  or in the immediately  preceding 
quarter.  Eventually  the influence  becomes  negative,  but the negative  co- 
efficients  are nowhere  near large enough to counteract  the strong con- 
temporaneous  effect.  As Bischoff  emphasizes,  the pattern  of response  to 
the service  price of capital  is very different:  it starts  at zero, builds to a 
peak,  and  then  subsides.  But only  three  of the coefficients  are  negative;  the 
equation  has the erroneous  implication  that a permanently  lower interest 
rate makes net investment  permanently  higher.  The explanation  for this 
finding  is not transparent,  but it is plainly incompatible  with the most 
general  principle  of investment  theory. 
The third  and fourth  columns  of table 2 show the results  of constrain- 
ing the coefficients  to eliminate  permanent  effects  on net investment.  The 
contemporaneous  relation  between  output  and  investment  remains  strong, 
but  the negative  part  of the distribution  comes  earlier  and is stronger.  The 
29. Now it is clear why Bischoff's equation was so dominant in his comparison 
with other investment  equations ("A Comparison  of Models"). The equations  based 
on Jorgenson's  work do embody the constraint  and so run under an enormous  handi- 
cap. Most of Bischoff's  victory is attributable  to this handicap  and not to the separate 
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effect  of the service  price remains  very different;  Bischoff's  central  argu- 
ment that output  and  the service  price are related  to investment  in rather 
different  ways is strongly  sustained  in these results.  But there is no rea- 
son to believe  a priori,  and  no evidence  in these results,  that  imposing  the 
theoretical  constraint  somehow completely overcomes  the problem of 
simultaneity.  The negative  weights  at the very end of the distribution  for 
the service-price  variable  are  particularly  suspect:  theory  permits  them  to 
be zero  but  not  negative. 
Another  way to express  the unsatisfactory  nature  of Bischoff's  results 
is to compute  the value of the depreciation  parameter,  8, for which the 
equation  really is an investment  function.  This can be done separately 
for the output  effects  and  the service-price  effects.  The rate  of depreciation 
that achieves  1(6B +  y')(1  -  8)  -  = 0 for the first  column  of table 2 is 
8.6 percent  a quarter,  or 30 percent  per year, far above any reasonable 
value. Equipment  that depreciates  this quickly  is often not classified  as 
capital  at all, in fact. The corresponding  calculation  for the service-price 
effects  yields  the  even  more  unreasonable  value  of 59 percent  a quarter. 
Taken  at face value,  Bischoff's  results  are  by far  the strongest  challenge 
to the principal  thesis of this paper.  According  to a corrected  version  of 
his equation,  about  half  of the accelerator  response  of investment  to output 
is estimated  to occur  within  a year  while  interest  effects  take much  longer. 
Those results  correspond  roughly  to row 3 of table 1, and thus  imply  that 
expenditure  policies  can have a substantial  effect  on GNP. However,  this 
conclusion  rests  on the proposition  that  the sum  of the accelerator  and  the 
marginal  propensity  to consume  is almost exactly one, so that the pure 
expenditure  process  is explosive  or nearly  so. This implication  of the cor- 
rected  putty-clay  findings  has not been widely appreciated  and probably 
makes  them less plausible  than they appear  to be when the equation  is 
studied  in isolation.  Unfortunately,  it appears  that a strong correlation 
between  the disturbance  in the investment  equation  and  the level of GNP 
is biasing  the equation  toward  too sharp  an initial  response  to changes  in 
output.  Certainly  the overwhelming  statistical  rejection  of the accelerator 
hypothesis  points in this direction.  Much more study of the investment 
equation,  with a great  deal more attention  to the critical  issue of simul- 
taneity,  will be required  to give convincing  evidence  that the accelerator 
effect  is as strong  as it appears  to be in regressions  that follow Bischoff's 
approach  but are made consistent  with investment  theory. For now, it 
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percent  of the long-run  effect, rather  than the 50 percent  figure  implied 
by equation  2.2. This brings  the effect of expenditures  on GNP into the 
range of 0.5  to 0.8,  rather than the 1.4 implied by that investment 
equation. 
Summary  of Evidence  on the  Three  "Qualifications" 
This paper  has presented  evidence  bearing  on the validity  of the three 
qualifications  of the  investment  process  listed  at the outset. 
LAGS 
The evidence  does have something  to say about  lags in the investment 
process, and they are an important  influence  in inhibiting  the response 
of investment  that would otherwise  make the IS curve very flat. Within 
the class of investment  functions  in which the same lag applies  to both 
the accelerator  effect and the interest-rate  effect, the evidence suggests 
that somewhere  between 10 percent  and 30 percent  of the long-run  re- 
sponse of capital  occurs  within  the first  year.  Investment  is very sluggish 
compared  to the aim of stabilization  policy. Still, the results  in table 1 
suggest  that the interest  sensitivity  of investment  over the first year is a 
major  influence  in weakening  expenditure  policy and  strengthening  mone- 
tary policy within  that period, even when the investment  response  is at 
the  low end  of the  range. 
PUTTY-CLAY 
Neither  the strict  putty-clay  nor  the strict  putty-putty  hypothesis  seems 
plausible,  but research  has not uncovered  the right  compromise  between 
them.  To the extent that putty-clay  predominates,  both expenditure  and 
monetary  policies have major effects within the first year, because the 
accelerator  effect acts well before  the inhibiting  interest-rate  effect.  Con- 
sistent  regressions  that correct  Bischoff's  approach  support  this view, but 
strong  evidence  of simultaneity  undermines  the usefulness  of those  results. 
The sharp  accelerator  response  of investment  in the first  year  after  output 
changes  is an unreasonable  feature  of the equation  quite apart  from the 
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accelerator,  much  more than the weak interest  response,  that makes ex- 
penditure  policy  so powerful  with  that  type  of investment  equation. 
TERM  STRUCTURE  OF  INTEREST  RATES 
As a matter  of theory,  what  belongs  in the service  price of capital  is a 
short-run  interest  rate,  though  the issue of short  against  long rates  is un- 
likely to be resolved  empirically.  But this is hardly  the end of the story. 
A more  general  question,  quite  beyond  the realm  of the investment  equa- 
tion, is the relation  between  the short-run  interest  rate appropriate  for 
investment  decisions  and the market  return  to short-term  financial  assets 
that is appropriate  for decisions  about holding  money.30  The traditional 
view, adopted  in the simple  IS-LM  model at the beginning  of the paper, 
is that  interest-bearing  financial  assets  and  real  capital  are  close substitutes, 
and money  is a weak substitute  for either.  Then markets  should  equalize 
the short-run  yields  of all nonmoney  assets,  and  the common  yield is what 
belongs  in the investment  equation.  If the various  kinds  of assets,  real and 
financial,  are  not close substitutes,  there  is no reason  to expect  markets  to 
equalize  yields.  In particular,  the yield from a very money-like  financial 
asset, say Treasury  bills or commercial  paper,  is not a good guide  to the 
market's  short-run  interest  rate or net yield from real capital. A better 
choice might be the expected short-run  yield from long-term  financial 
assets.  This line of argument  does not seem to suggest  that the long rate 
itself belongs  in the investment  equation,  however.  Further,  it does not 
have any  definite  implication  with  respect  to the basic issue of the interest 
elasticity  of investment  and  the effects  of alternative  stabilization  policies. 
Conclusions 
Economists  do not seem  to be ready  to make  precise  statements  about 
the effects  of stabilization  policies  on gross national  product.  This paper 
has focused on the role of the investment  process in stabilization.  The 
IS-LM  model makes  it clear how important  the negative  response  of in- 
vestment  to interest  rates  is in limiting  the effect  of expenditure  policy and 
providing  the principal  immediate  effect of monetary  policy. Empirical 
evidence  on the interest  and accelerator  responses  of investment  is weak, 
30. I am grateful to Benjamin  Friedman  for a helpful discussion  of this point. Robert  E. Hall  101 
however.  The calculations  at the beginning  of the paper  do suggest  that 
the conventional  estimate  for the effect of expenditure  increases-about 
$1.5 billion  in GNP in the first  year  for each $1 billion  of expenditure-is 
probably  on the high side. Indeed,  perfectly  reasonable  assumptions  give 
rise  to effects  only  half as large.  A hard  look at the limited  evidence  on the 
IS curve  makes  exclusive  reliance  on expenditure  policy seem an unwise 
approach  to stabilization. 
The same factors  that make one policy weak make the other strong. 
Given the uncertainty  about these factors,  especially  about the slope of 
the IS curve, it would make sense to adopt balanced  combinations  of 
stabilization  policies.  The negative  covariance  of the effects  of the policies 
would  make  the uncertainty  about  the effect  of the total  package  less than 
the uncertainty  about  any individual  component.  The design  of stabiliza- 
tion policies needs to protect  against  the very real possibility  of a flat IS 
curve. 
APPENDIX 
Parameters  of the IS-LM  Model 
THIS  APPENDIX  outlines  the derivation  of the parameters  of the IS-LM 
model  used  in the text. 
Consumption  Function 
To get rough  estimates  of the marginal  propensities  to consume  out of 
gross  national  product,  I simply  ran  two regressions  of the first  difference 
of real consumption  of nondurables  and services  and the first difference 
of real  expenditures  on durables  on the first  difference  of real  GNP for the 
years  1950-76. The resulting  coefficients  (actually  the sum of the current 
and three lagged quarterly  coefficients)  were 0.20 for nondurables  and 
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Money-Demand  Function 
Research  on money  demand  is currently  in an unsatisfactory  state be- 
cause of the puzzling  behavior  of interest  rates  relative  to income  and the 
money  supply  in 1976 and 1977. Stephen  M. Goldfeld's  careful  investiga- 
tions of money demand  both before and after the puzzle appeared  are 
difficult  to embed  in a simple  LM curve.31  First,  Goldfeld  finds  consistently 
that  the income  elasticity  of money  demand  over a one-year  period  is less 
than 1/2.  The result  is a startlingly  large shift in the LM curve for each 
billion dollars  of monetary  expansion:  at least a 2 percent increase  in 
income  is necessary  to hold interest  rates  constant  in the face of a 1 per- 
cent increase  in the money  supply.  Goldfeld's  low income  elasticity  arises 
from  the pronounced  downward  trend  in M, relative  to GNP. Since  there 
is no other trend  variable  in his equation,  the coefficient  of log GNP is 
determined  largely  by the requirement  that the rate of growth of real 
money demand  is about  half as high as the rate of growth  of real GNP. 
Adding a time trend  to his equation  increases  the estimated  income elas- 
ticity substantially,  to almost  0.8. Second,  Goldfeld's  most important  in- 
terest rate is the yield on time deposits  at banks, which is not likely to 
respond  very  much  to monetary  or  fiscal  policy. 
In an effort  to sort  out these  two problems  in adapting  Goldfeld's  equa- 
tion for the present  purposes,  I fitted  the following  regression  to annual 
data  for  M. for 1954 to 1976: 
log M/p  =  0.56 +  0.78 log Y -  0.014 log r -  0.021t. 
(0.86)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.005) 
A2 =  0.94;  standard error =  0.013;  p  =  0.81. 
The numbers  in parentheses  are standard  errors.  The single interest  rate 
here  is the yield  on four-  to six-month  commercial  paper.  Variants  of this 
equation,  including  the use of quarterly  data,  produced  similar  results.  In 
all cases, the statistical  evidence  in favor  of the trend  is unambiguous  and 
the inclusion  of the trend  dramatically  increases  the income  elasticity.  It 
also  reduces  the interest  elasticity,  which  in all cases  was smaller  in magni- 
tude  than  Goldfeld  found. 
At probable  1977 levels (GNP of $1,325 billion and money supply 
31.  "The Demand for Money Revisited,"  BPEA, 3:1973, pp. 577-638, and "The 
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of $230 billion,  both  in 1972 prices), the income  elasticity  of 0.78 implies 
that  an increase  of $1 billion  in GNP will raise  money  demand  by $0.135 
billion. This income effect  was used in the IS-LM model (,  = 0.135). 
The regression  implies  that an increase  in the interest  rate of 100 basis 
points, from 5 percent  to 6 percent  per year,  will reduce  real money de- 
mand  by $0.59 billion.  By contrast,  in Goldfeld's  basic  equation  ("Case  of 
the Missing  Money,"  table 1, first  line, p. 686),  an increase  of the same 
amount  in the commercial  paper  rate alone  raises  real money  demand  by 
$1.84 billion. If both the commercial  paper rate and the rate on time 
deposits  increase  by 100 basis points,  real money  demand  rises by $6.13 
billion, according  to Goldfeld.  As a compromise  I took the interest-rate 
parameter  of the IS-LM  model  ('2)  to be 2.00. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Christopher  A. Sims:  Hall argues  for the view that  capital  is homogeneous 
and  flexible,  for  practical  purposes,  and  that  therefore  price  incentives  can 
be effective  in stimulating  investment  even when output  is below trend. 
This is to be contrasted  with  the perhaps  more  widely accepted  view that 
at low points of the cycle excess capacity  forms a heavy cloud over in- 
vestors'  spirits,  preventing  price  incentives  from  brightening  things  much. 
Hall's view is internally  consistent  and broadly  consistent  with the exist- 
ing statistical  evidence,  in my view. Where  I may differ  from Hall is in 
thinking  that  the "excess  capacity  as a heavy cloud"  view is equally  con- 
sistent  internally  and  consistent  with  the statistical  evidence.  The truth  is, 
as Hall makes  apparent,  we don't  know much about some of the critical 
issues  related  to evaluating  the effects  of monetary  and  expenditure  policy 
on investment. 
The central  question  is whether  it is reasonable  to treat new and old 
capital as technically  interchangeable.  There is no solid statistical  evi- 
dence that the cost of capital  strongly  affects  investment  (as opposed  to 
long-run  capital  stock), in my view. Estimates  that claim to have found 
such  an  effect  fall  into  two classes:  those  using  models  in which  output  and 
cost-of-capital  effects  are  tied together  a priori,  and those in which  equity 
prices are introduced  into the formula  for the rental  price of capital.  If 
capital  adjusts  very  slowly  to its equilibrium  value, one expects  to see in- 
vestment  showing  strong  positive correlation  with stock prices, because 
both  investment  and  stock  prices  will reflect  expected  future  yields.  Thus  a 
strong  negative  "effect"  on investment  of the ratio of dividend  yield to 
equity  prices  is not strong  evidence  against  a view that  investment  is price 
inelastic.  But this appears  to be the only kind of evidence available  in 
empirical  work. 
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Hall is right  to suggest  that identification  problems  might well com- 
pletely explain  the erratic  behavior  of cost-of-capital  variables  in invest- 
ment-equation  regressions,  however. 
In the absence  of conclusive  statistical  evidence,  Hall presents  three 
arguments  that vintage effects are negligible.  In evaluating  these argu- 
ments,  it is important  to have  in mind  the correct  condition  that  will allow 
vintage  effects  to be ignored.  Franklin  Fisher developed  that in a 1965 
article  in Review  of Economic  Studies:  at any one time  capital  of all vin- 
tages must  have the same gross  margin.  This condition  is a little weaker 
than Hall's condition  that their marginal  products  differ  only by an ex- 
ponential  depreciation  factor.  One can easily  imagine  examples  in which 
the Hall condition  is violated-for  instance,  in any situation  in which in- 
vestors  expect  that capital  currently  being purchased  will all be replaced 
at roughly  the same time. Hall's first  argument  for negligible  vintage  ef- 
fects, that  it is "hard  to think  of realistic  conditions"  under  which  Fisher's 
conditions  are  violated,  is therefore  unconvincing. 
The Fisher capital-aggregation  condition  is exactly what Hall needs 
for his argument  early in the paper that short rates are all that matter 
in the investment  function.  Later  in the paper,  Hall argues  that it is the 
price elasticity  of output  on old equipment  that determines  the degree  to 
which  investment  responds  to changes  in the price of capital.  While  it is 
true  that  the price  elasticity  of output  could  be high  on old equipment  even 
though  Fisher's  aggregation  condition  is not close to being true, Hall's 
argument  is incomplete.  The response  of investment  to capital cost de- 
pends  on the response  of price  to capital  cost (Hall's  dju/dv) as  well as on 
the response  of output  on old equipment  to price.  If average  variable  cost 
on old equipment  cannot  be radically  reduced  by reducing  output  on the 
old equipment,  one gets the commonsense  result  that  changes  in the short 
interest  rate  that  are  not expected  to persist  have  little  effect  on investment, 
even if output  on old equipment  is price  elastic.  Hall's second argument, 
that  vintage  effects  are negligible  because  the price elasticity  of output  on 
old equipment  is high,  therefore  founders  on his having  failed  to consider 
vintage  effects  on d,u/dv. 
Hall claims that the positively  sloped IS curve that emerges  from his 
version  of Bischoff's  equation  is a priori  implausible.  Perhaps  because  of 
a deficiency  in my stock of a priori  knowledge,  I find  this third  argument 
unconvincing  as  well. 
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is in infinitely  elastic supply and investment  is reversible,  it is hardly 
surprising  that a short rate is what matters  for such a liquid asset. If 
putty-clay  effects are important,  the whole term structure  is relevant. 
Even without  putty-clay  effects,  if capital is in inelastic supply, the ex- 
pected  rate  of change  of the price  of capital  goods enters  the service  cost. 
The expected  rate of change  is not derivable  from the history  of capital- 
goods prices in general, and in fact, under some assumptions,  may be 
embodied  in the gap  between  the long and  the short  rate. 
Expectational  lags are not so easily handled  as Hall suggests.  First, if 
the autoregressive  structure  of "desired  capital"  is not second-order  Pascal 
as in Hall's  example,  it could  easily  happen  that  expectational  lags  lengthen 
rather  than  shorten  the estimated  lag distribution  relative  to the physical- 
lag distribution.  More important,  expectational  lags for either  the cost of 
capital  or output  will in general  involve  both variables.  Thus  relative  sizes 
of sums  of coefficients  in distributed  lags bear  no necessary  relation  to the 
policy-relevant  price  and  output  elasticities. 
Measurement  error,  on which Hall relies to cast doubt on the small 
coefficients  in the "q theory"  regressions,  does not in fact create  a bias of 
determinate  sign here. It seems quite likely that fluctuations  in the stock 
market's  evaluation  of intangible  capital are positively correlated  with 
fluctuations  in the stock market's  evaluation  of tangible capital. Thus 
measurement-error  bias from this source might actually  tend to inflate 
rather  than  reduce  the estimated  coefficient  on q. 
Hall is right  to suggest  that simultaneity  problems  are probably  critical 
to what  comes  out of "'investment"  or "saving"  function  regressions.  Hall's 
idea  for testing  for simultaneity  is not a good one, however.  The idea that 
long-run  effects  of output  on net investment  must  be zero is plausible  in a 
model  with static  technology.  But the underlying  reason  is that in such a 
model  stationary  fluctuation  in output  cannot  plausibly  lead  to unbounded 
variation  in capital-output  ratios.  It is also implausible,  however,  that  with 
static utility functions and stationary  fluctuations  in income, desired 
wealth-income  ratios  wander  unboundedly.  There  is no carefully  worked 
out theory of saving  that implies  a relation  of the level of saving  to the 
level of output  in the long  run.  Thus  there  is no good argument  that  simul- 
taneous-equations  bias will bias sums of coefficients  on output in net- 
investment  equations  away  from  one. 
So where  does the levels relation  come from?  In part, from statistical 
artifact.  Plausible  assumptions  suggest  that the negative  part of the lag Robert E. Hall  107 
distribution  on output  should  be long and  flat.  It is easy to show that  such 
long, flat,  low tails are difficult  to estimate,  and that  there  is likely  to be a 
strong temptation  to truncate  the lag distribution  before the long thin 
tail and  end  up with  only the short,  fat, positive  part.  Also, in reality,  non- 
stationary  movement  in technology  may occur.  And finally,  Hall claims 
to adapt his test for a stable capital-output  ratio to a gross-investment 
equation  under general  putty-clay  assumptions;  but in a general  putty- 
clay model  there  is no exogenous,  fixed  rate  of depreciation.  Since  Hall's 
adapted  test rests on use of a fixed depreciation  rate,  its interpretation  is 
at  best  debatable. 
Franco  Modigliani:  By way of introduction,  I should  explain  that,  as MIT 
colleagues,  Robert Hall and I agreed  to avoid praising  each other, and 
instead  to take  our  gloves  off. 
When I tried to formulate  my comment  on this paper,  I recalled  the 
famous  fable by Edmund  Phelps in his classic  paper  on the golden rule, 
and I shall use a similar  tale. I imagine  that the prince  of the realm de- 
cides  one night  that  he wants  somebody  to show  that  fiscal  policy  is power- 
less and monetary  policy  very  powerful.  He asks  his adviser,  "Who  is the 
most  brilliant  young  economist  in the realm  to carry  out this task?" 
The designated  man  then  is asked  to do that.  He does  it with  great  relish, 
and  finds  that  it is just  his cup of tea. For several  months  he works  as hard 
as he can, making  the case-without violating  conspicuously  the rules  of 
the game.  The outcome  of that  effort  is now before  us. 
It is full of interesting  and challenging  ideas, even though  it is some- 
times irritating,  and even though  it takes several  days to read it because 
the reader  has to be careful  about  what  might  be slipped  by him. But for 
all its brilliance,  I doubt that it will persuade  many that the first year's 
effects of fiscal and monetary  policy are, respectively,  as puny and as 
gigantic  as  they  are  reported  to be in table 1! 
But let us follow our hero on the path  that leads to table 1. Of course, 
the brilliant  young man knows that, to make monetary  policy powerful 
and  fiscal  policy powerless,  it takes  a very steep  LM curve  and a very  flat 
IS curve.  He further  knows that three  factors  stand in the way of a flat 
IS curve.  One is adjustment  lags;  the second  is the putty-clay  technology; 
and the third is the fact that money affects short-term  interest rates 
promptly  and directly,  while investment  depends  on long-term  interest 
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I need not say much about the first  issue, the lags, because even our 
brilliant  economist,  after  all, cannot  budge  the finding  of substantial  lags, 
whether  these be due to putty-clay  or other  reasons. 
A major  novelty  in Hall's attack  is his criticism  of the traditional  view 
that investment depends on  the long-term interest rate. He  argues, 
instead,  that  the only rate  that  matters  is the short-term  interest  rate. 
One  may  well accept  the proposition  that  short-term  interest  rates  may 
matter  for investment.  Stephen  Marglin  once argued,  quite  rightly,  that a 
single  investment  project  must  meet two tests. One is the long-run  test: it 
must  be profitable  at the current  long rate. If it meets that test, the next 
question  is, "Could  it be profitably  postponed?"  That  answer  depends,  es- 
sentially,  on the relation  between  the current  short and long rates.  If the 
project  meets  the first  test, but the short  rate  is too high,  it may  be worth- 
while to postpone,  because  the project  will not pay for itself in the near 
future. 
If, on the other hand, the short rate is below the long rate, then the 
second  test is immaterial  because  any  project  that  meets  the long-rate  test 
will also beat the short  rate. It is only when the short rate is above the 
long  rate  that  the double  test applies.  In early  work  on the MPS  model,  we 
looked for evidence  that  short  rates  mattered  when they were above  long 
rates.  We did not get any  significant  results,  but in principle  that  is a valid 
point. 
But how can one claim that only the short  rate matters?  One possible 
way is to imagine  that  capital  is just  putty: the firm  has a certain  quantity 
of it, but  it can  dispose  of as much  as it wants  in the next  period.  Clearly,  if 
the firm  can resell the putty  in the next period  at a known  price,  it need 
only be concerned  with the interest  cost for the current  period-that  is, 
the short  rate.  But our  economist  makes  a far  more  general  claim.  He con- 
tends  that  with  putty-putty  technology  it is immaterial  whether  or not the 
capital  goods can be readily  resold.  Actually,  this claim can be shown  to 
be valid only in one special case-namely,  on the assumption  that the 
quantity  of "putty"  capital  that the firm  is considering  holding  today on 
the  basis  of the short  rate  is less than (or at least  not more  than) the quan- 
tity it would want to have tomorrow,  after  allowing  for the depreciation 
between  today  and  tomorrow.  Under  these  circumstances,  the firm  makes 
a decision  now that  has  no bearing  on what  it will have  tomorrow,  because 
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absolutely  right: only the short-term  rate will matter.  In principle,  the 
one-day rate is all that is needed to decide on the amount  of capital  to 
hold each  day. 
The mere  fact that  the putty-putty  model  can  lead to this absurd  conse- 
quence is a good reason  why it makes no sense. As soon as putty-clay 
characteristics  are recognized,  the whole argument  disappears,  and in- 
vestors have to worry about the whole future  path of interest  rates. In 
particular,  especially  when one recognizes  limited  ex post substitution,  it 
will normally  be the case that for long-lived  investments  what matters  is 
the long-run  interest  rate-except  when the short  rate is so much above 
the long rate  that  it may  be a sufficient  barrier  to investment.  One  wonders 
whether  Hall is really  serious  when  he states  that it is "clear  that the ser- 
vice  price  of capital  depends  on the  short-run  interest  rate." 
Since the argument  about the short rate rests to a large extent on 
putty-putty,  our author  has to destroy  the competing  putty-clay  hypoth- 
esis. That  attack  takes  many  forms  in the paper.  First  he sets forth  a num- 
ber of arguments,  old and  new, as to why there  may  be significant  ex post 
substitution  between  labor  and  capital.  As far as I can see, the most rele- 
vant one is that even though  the ratio of plant to labor may be fixed  per 
unit of time, the substitution  can occur  by way of varying  the number  of 
hours  per year that a plant is combined  with labor;  thus a higher  rental 
rate  for capital  might  well, in principle,  lead to introducing  an extra  shift. 
But, even granting  the validity  of this argument  in principle,  I would ex- 
pect the elasticity of substitution  through  this mechanism  to be quite 
small  because  of extreme  discontinuities.  To be sure,  in the short  run  one 
can change  utilization  through  overtime  and some extra  shifts;  but in the 
long run,  one must  basically  operate  with  one shift  or two (or three), but 
cannot  respond  to a 10 percent  rise in the rental  rate by adding  a small 
fraction  of a shift.  On the whole,  I see Hall's arguments  as merely  provid- 
ing one more illustration  of the proposition  that nothing  in economics  is 
ever completely  black or white. If asked: "Is there never any ex post 
substitution  between  capital  and  labor?"  I would  have answered:  "Never? 
Well, hardly  ever!"  After Hall's paper,  my answer  remains  pretty  much 
the  same. 
But the main attack  on putty-clay  takes the form of a severe critique 
of the major  empirical  work in this area,  which is that of Bischoff.  As a 
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expressed  as a function  of a distributed  lag on income, estimates  of the 
parameters  of the  function  may  be biased.  We all know  that,  when  there  is 
simultaneity,  this problem  does exist to some degree. 
With this background,  Hall goes into a rather  technical  and lengthy 
discussion  of results  of a Bischoff-type  equation  fitted  by him using  actual 
investment,  ignoring  several  other  existing  putty-clay  equations  based on 
new orders  and  hence  less subject  to simultaneity  bias (for example,  that 
of Ando, Modigliani,  Rasche,  and Turnovsky  in International Economic 
Review, in June 1974). He argues  that  his Bischoff-type  equation  implies 
either  an unrealistically  high rate of depreciation  or else that net invest- 
ment  depends  on the  level and  not merely  on the rate  of change  of (desired) 
output.  From  this  he concludes  that  the equation  must  be subject  to bias  so 
severe as to make it of little relevance,  except  possibly  for further  study. 
My interpretation  of his results  is rather  different:  the coefficients  of 
his equation  imply  merely  that the accelerator  effect-the  cumulated  re- 
sponse  of net investment  to a step change  in output-is  somewhat  on the 
low side compared  with the long-run  response  of gross investment  to a 
constant  level of output,  which  represents,  of course,  replacement  invest- 
ment.  This  conclusion  turns  out to hold also  for the equations  of Ando and 
his associates,  mentioned  above,  though  in lesser  degree.  As noted  by Hall, 
the two responses  can  be reconciled  by assuming  a sufficiently  high  rate  of 
depreciation.  But even for Ando and his colleagues,  the required  rate is 
above 7 percent  per quarter,  which  is not very realistic.  One must agree, 
therefore,  that  the estimated  coefficients  are  likely  to be somewhat  biased. 
However, Hall concludes,  without apparent  justification,  that the bias 
consists  in an overestimate  of the (long-run) response  to the level of out- 
put. My own calculations,  on the other hand, suggest  that this long-run 
response  is broadly  consistent  with a reasonable  depreciation  rate and 
the average capital-output  ratio; the bias is, instead, in the estimated 
accelerator  response  which  is somewhat  low. There  is no reason  to believe 
that this bias is particularly  related  to simultaneity-especially  when the 
dependent  variable  is new orders.  A more  likely major  explanation  is at- 
tenuation  due to errors  of measurement,  including  misspecifications  of 
some of the independent  variables.  This  is but a small  blemish  for a rather 
complex,  highly  nonlinear,  equation  that otherwise  makes  a lot of sense, 
especially  when even Hall's results  provide  strong  confirmation  that the 
pattern  of response  to output  and to the interest  rate are quite different, 
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It is, therefore,  good that  in table 1 Hall has provided  estimates  of the 
differential  policy  implications  of putty-clay  as well as putty-putty,  though 
in my view the relevance  of this table is most doubtful.  In the first  place, 
Hall's estimates  of the putty-clay  response  are rather  arbitrary.  The esti- 
mates  of Ando and  his associates  suggest  a slower  accelerator  response  in 
the first year, especially  after allowing  for the lag of deliveries  behind 
orders.  Hall's assumption  of one-eighth  response  to interest  rates  is no- 
where  explained,  but seems  high.  Under  putty-clay,  the response  is related 
basically to the depreciation  rate, and for total investment  that rate is 
likely to be rather  less than one-tenth.  But the main factor  that puts the 
results  of table 1 beyond the pale, in my view, is the combination  of the 
following assumptions,  which are questionable  individually  but plainly 
incredible  taken  together.  The first  is the crucial  assumption-designed  to 
insure  a very  steep  LM curve  and  defended  most  unconvincingly  in an ap- 
pendix-that  the demand  for money is extremely  interest  inelastic,  and 
hence short-term  interest  rates  are extremely  volatile;  a 1 percent  change 
in the money  supply  is assumed  to reduce  the short-term  rate  by roughly 
25 percent,  while a 1 percent  rise in real income  increases  it by over 15 
percent!  These estimates  are many times larger  than those implied by 
Goldfeld's  money-demand  equations  or, even more by the MPS's.  All of 
the extreme  results  of table 1, especially  with  respect  to changes  in M1,  be- 
come readily  understandable  when one recognizes  that this first  assump- 
tion is combined  with two more: (1)  that investment  decisions  respond 
exclusively  to that volatile short-term  rate-specifically the rate on four- 
to six-month commercial  paper; and (2)  that through  putty-putty,  a 
change  of 100 basis points  in that  rate will produce  promptly  investment 
of $84 billion  (in 1972 prices)! 
No wonder that, for most of the cases considered,  a change in M1 
produces  an ultra-monetarist  first-year  effect  close to, or even  larger  than, 
the current  velocity  of circulation,  whereas  fiscal  policy can hardly  get off 
the  ground. 
Finally,  let me mention  one general  complaint  about  the relevance  of 
the comparisons  between  fiscal  and  monetary  policy presented  in table 1, 
even if I thought  the entries  in the table had any empirical  relevance.  I 
submit  that whenever  we look at the effects of stimulative  changes in 
taxes  and  government  expenditures,  what  must  be kept constant  is the in- 
terest rate, not the money supply.  Why would anyone  want to keep the 
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this should  hold with  special  force  for those  who believe  in the potency  of 
money. Only  if the government  is trying  to increase  its expenditure  at the 
expense  of investment  should  it keep the money supply  constant.  But if 
it is trying  to increase  income-and  not to reduce  investment  or to in- 
crease  interest  rates  (for  balance-of-payment  reasons,  say) -then  it would 
just  waste  part  of its effort  by keeping  the money  supply  constant. 
In the present state of the economy, for instance,  we ought to have 
expansionary  monetary  policy and expansionary  fiscal policy, and stop 
the nonsense  about  the fear  of inflation  being linked  to monetary  growth. 
If inflation  is the main  worry,  we should  not want  any stimulation.  If we 
want stimulation,  we should  use monetary  policy to reinforce  and not to 
offset  fiscal  policy. 
By the time  I was through  with  the paper,  I actually  felt relieved.  I had 
been exposed  to the most serious  and brilliant  attack  I could imagine  on 
several  issues on which  I have strong  convictions,  like the importance  of 
the long rate, putty-clay,  a first-year  fiscal multiplier  in excess of one. I 
was glad to see that  my views  came  out basically  unscathed  by this  paper. 
William  Brainard:  I want  to comment  on James  Tobin's  theory  of invest- 
ment which Hall describes  as a major competitor  to Jorgenson's  theo- 
retical  framework,  and to offer some observations  about the Jorgenson- 
Hall theory.  One major  feature  of Tobin's  approach  is its stress on the 
difference  between  the required  return  to capital  and the return  on finan- 
cial assets.  The reasons  include  differences  in maturity,  but perhaps  more 
important,  encompass  differences  in various  types of risk-of  inflation, 
of default,  of changing  demand  and  technology. 
In order  to understand  the mechanism  by which monetary  policy or 
other financial  events affect  investment  it would be desirable  to have a 
direct  measure  of the required  rate  on capital.  Such  measures  are difficult 
to come  by precisely  because  the distinctive  uncertainties  on capital  men- 
tioned  above  make  it hard  to identify  its expected  profitability.  Empirical 
work  by Tobin and  myself  and  by Modigliani,  as well as evidence  on the 
historical  return  to investment,  suggests  that the required  rate on capital 
is not only substantially  higher  than  the required  rates on bills or bonds, 
but  is far  from  perfectly  correlated  with  them. 
Tobin's  q model of investment,  empirically  implemented  by John Cic- 
colo of Boston College, shortcuts  the need for a separate  calculation  of 
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flect changes  both in the required  rate of return  and in the market's  cal- 
culation  of marginal  profitability,  their  separate  identification  isn't  needed 
if firms  are behaving  in accordance  with the q model. Firms will invest 
when the securities  market  places a high value on investment  relative  to 
its cost.  The  financial  markets  do the  job of calculating  for  them. 
Why don't  firms  adjust  their  capital  stock instantaneously  to maintain 
the equilibrium  value  of q?  This  is analogous  to the  classic  question  of why 
investment  demand  should  remain  finite  with  changes  in the interest  rate. 
Tobin's  view, in common  with that of many  other  writers,  is that costs of 
adjustment  of the capital  stock,  both to the firm  and to the economy,  are 
important  elements  in the explanation.  Hall is right,  however,  in suggest- 
ing that adjustment  costs are not a necessary  feature  of the q model. One 
could accept  that model without  believing  that the adjustment  costs are 
important,  or believe  the costs are important  without  accepting  a formu- 
lation that works through the financial  market's  valuation of  capital 
goods. In principle,  in a competitive  world,  increasing  costs and capacity 
limitations  in the construction  and capital-goods  industries  show up as a 
rising supply price of capital goods, and do not enter the investment- 
demand  equation.  To make sense of many  macro  models one has to as- 
sume that such supply  considerations  are unimportant,  or that they are 
implicitly  incorporated  in the investment  "demand"  equation  or schedule. 
Hall objects  to inclusion  of supply  considerations  in the aggregate-demand 
equation,  but does not claim  that they are unimportant  to understanding 
the level of investment.  He owes us either  an explicit  justification  for ex- 
cluding flow considerations  from the supply side, or a capital-goods 
supply  equation  in his model. Indeed, if because  of costs of adjustment 
internal  to the firm  or some other  reason  firms  need to predict  the price 
of capital  goods, the supply  side is relevant  to investment  demand.  For 
example,  if firms  are aware  that  the supply  price  is a function  of operating 
rates  in the capital-goods  industry,  then they are likely to view the exist- 
ing relative  prices  of capital  goods as unusually  high (low) when operat- 
ing  rates  of that  industry  are  extremely  high (low). 
Hall follows Jorgenson  in building  the theory of investment  around 
the concept  of the service  price  of capital.  According  to Hall, it is quite 
unambiguous  that the service price should be based on the short-term 
rate  of interest.  In the absence  of markets  for used capital  goods a crucial 
element  in the argument  is that firms  never  have to worry  about getting 
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tomorrow  anyway.  At the aggregate  level that has been true since the 
Great Depression,  but aggregation  conceals the variation  of experience 
among  firms.  It seems  fair  to say  that  any  firm  that  goes bankrupt,  or finds 
itself  boarding  up windows,  should  have  been  worrying  about  that  possibil- 
ity when  it undertook  investment.  The problem  for the firm  is exacerbated 
by the heterogeneity  of capital  goods. A firm  that is buying  new trucks 
may have too many  machine  tools. If I ever find a corporation  that be- 
haves  in the Jorgenson-Hall  fashion,  looking  only one year  ahead  in mak- 
ing twenty-year  investments  and responding  only to the current  bill rate, 
I'll sell short. Aggregation,  of course, can conceal-even  mitigate-a 
multitude  of sins,  but  I see no reason  to believe  that  the profit-maximizing 
behavior  of a firm  assumed  to have the characteristics  of the aggregate 
should  be a good approximation  of the aggregate  behavior  of individual 
firms  which face imperfect  capital-goods  markets  and invest in specific 
types  of capital. 
- Hall and Jorgenson  give the impression  that it is straightforward  to 
construct  a theory  of investment  around  the concept  of a service  price of 
capital  which  also includes  a distributed  lag of investment  in response  to 
its determinants.  In fact, it is quite a trick.  It is difficult  if not impossible 
to find  conditions  that  justify  the use of the service  price  of capital  based 
on the short  rate and yet allow for the many circumstances  that prevent 
the firm from continuously  equating  the actual to the desired stock of 
capital.  Hall follows  Jorgenson  in assuming  that the process  of designing, 
ordering,  and  installing  capital  follows a fixed  time schedule.  In my view, 
adjustment  costs are the explanation  of the implied  lags, rather  than an 
alternative  explanation,  as Hall states.  In a theoretical  investigation  I am 
reluctant  to treat the lags as entirely  mechanical  rather  than the conse- 
quence  of an economic  calculation.  Assuming  they are mechanical,  how- 
ever, why doesn't the Jorgenson-Hall  firm manipulate  orders to keep 
capital  precisely  on target  (assuming  that some capital  is delivered  in the 
period  orders  are  placed) or on the expected  target  only the minimum  lag 
away?  Hall gets out of that  bind by assuming  that capital  with short de- 
livery lags cannot  substitute  for capital  with longer delivery  lags. Types 
of capital are now defined  by their delivery  lag! How is it that capital 
goods that  cannot  substitute  for each other  during  the investment  process 
end up as homogeneous  capital  in a Cobb-Douglas  production  function? 
If each  lag does refer  to a distinct  type of capital  and production  process, 
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the firm able to place separate  orders for each type? Why, therefore, 
doesn't  the "lag  distribution"  reflect  the time  pattern  of expected  needs  for 
capital  of various  types rather  than the mechanical  delivery  schedule?  If 
capital  goods are complements,  how can the delivery  of capital  with the 
shortest  lag affect  output  and "its"  quasi-rent  prior  to the delivery  of com- 
plementary  capital  with  longer  lags? 
Hall asserts  that  his most  sluggish  investment  response  in table 1, which 
assumes  one-eighth  of the long-run  response  in the first  year,  is consistent 
with Ciccolo's  empirical  estimates  of the q model.  Hall's  derivation  of the 
relationship  between  I and q involves a number  of assumptions  and ap- 
proximations  that  prevent  one from  having  much  confidence  in the asser- 
tion. Hall ignores the lag of approximately  three quarters  in Ciccolo's 
investment  equation.  In calculating  q he does not discount  excess quasi- 
rents,  even though  some of them  are  far in the future.  This tends  to mini- 
mize the apparent  discrepancy  between the desired and actual capital 
associated  with a given q. He calculates  quasi-rents  separately  on capital 
of "different  lags,"  even though  he uses the characteristics  of the aggre- 
gate production  function  to estimate  the quasi-rents  of each type, and 
then  simply  adds  them  up. 
It seems difficult  to reconcile the observed  deviations  of q from its 
equilibrium  value  with  the view that  these  deviations  simply  reflect  the ex- 
cess quasi-rents  that accrue  while delivery  takes  place. Since 1960, q has 
ranged  from  0.75 to 1.36 according  to the Council  of Economic  Advisers 
(up to 1.67 according  to Ciccolo). The inconsistency  of fluctuations  of 
this magnitude  and Hall's view can be seen by taking a set of extreme 
assumptions,  all tending  to minimize  the amount  of investment  required 
to restore  equilibrium. 
Suppose  quasi-rents  are not discounted,  and that the market  assumes 
that  current  quasi-rents  go on forever.  Then  a change  in required  rate  that 
increases  q from 1 to 1.3 implies (for the Cobb-Douglas)  that desired 
capital is 30 percent greater  than actual. If complete adjustment  took 
place in ten years, and the investment  was spread  out evenly  rather  than 
bunched  at the  beginning,  as assumed  by Hall, this  would  imply  increasing 
investment  by about  4.2 percent  of GNP for each  of the ten years (assum- 
ing Hall's  barely  credible  capital-output  ratio  of 1.4)! 
In fact, of course,  Ciccolo's  investment  equation  implies  substantially 
less investment  in the first  year than is given  by this calculation;  and the 
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ing account  of discounting  and the elimination  of excess quasi-rents  as 
investment  takes  place,  is much  greater  than  30 percent--probably  some- 
thing on the order  of 60 to 90 percent.  The fraction  of the long-run  re- 
sponse in the first  year implied  by Ciccolo's equation  is more like one- 
thirty-second  than  the one-eighth  used in Hall's  table 1, even ignoring  the 
lags  in Ciccolo's  equation. 
Hall stresses  the fact that  in his model,  no matter  how much  he waters 
down  his beliefs  about  the response  of investment  to interest  rates,  he gets 
a small expenditure  multiplier  and a large money multiplier.  This is 
hardly  surprising  given  the assumed  inelasticity  of the demand  for money 
and  the use of the bill rate  in both the demand-for-money  and  investment 
equations.  Hall's  interest  elasticity  of the demand  for money  is essentially 
an average  of zero and Goldfeld's  estimate,  and  I assume  others  will take 
him to task  for the cavalier  estimation  of this crucial  parameter.  Of equal 
importance  is his reliance  on a single  short  rate to equilibrate  the model. 
As my comments  above  indicate,  I do not believe there are strong  theo- 
retical or empirical  reasons for using the short rate in the investment 
equation.  Hall concedes  the importance  of lags in the delivery  of capital 
goods, and  that  by itself is enough  to rule  out a very short  rate.  On Hall's 
assumption  that the mean delivery  lag is about two years, the current 
three-month  bill rate is surely  a poor approximation  of what he should 
be interested  in, even in terms  of his own model. The expected  short  rate 
implicit  in borrowing  long now, and  lending  long a year  from now, is far 
from perfectly  correlated  with the bill rate, and even advocates  of the 
expectations  theory  allow  for a risk  premium  that  makes  long rates  higher 
than short rates. That concession alone changes the relevant  elasticity 
calculation.  If a short  rate  were to be used, I would not want to use the 
bill rate or the short  rate implicit  in the return  on other  financial  assets, 
but  the short-term  required  rate  on capital,  which  is not likely  to be highly 
correlated  with  them. 
If for either  risk  or maturity  reasons,  capital  is not a perfect  substitute 
for bills, there will be slippage  between  the federal funds or bill rates, 
which  are  directly  affected  by monetary  policy,  and  the required  rate  rele- 
vant to the IS curve.  The greater  this slippage,  the less direct  and potent 
is the influence  of the Federal  Reserve  on investment,  and the less gov- 
ernment  expenditures  will crowd  out private  investment.  I hasten  to add 
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able, in the demand-for-money  equation  would not be the solution.  The 
error  is in believing  that the rates  relevant  to these two markets  are tied 
tightly  and  mechanically  together  in either  the short  or the long run. 
Robert  E. Hall:  After  a very  determined  effort  to explain  why  my IS curve 
is so flat,  I learn  that  what  is really  the matter-in the view of my critics- 
is that my LM curve  is too steep!  Much of the criticism  of the paper  re- 
lates not so much  to its conclusions  about  the investment  equation  but to 
the way that  equation  is embedded  in a model  of the rest of the economy. 
Within  the realm  of the investment  equation  itself, some of my discus- 
sants  are worried  that the entire  theoretical  apparatus  requires  the belief 
that  investment  undertaken  today  will not be so large  as to push expected 
investment  next year to zero. None of the marginal  conditions  that are 
crucial in my restatement  of investment  theory are relevant  if planned 
future  investment  is zero. This is the sense in which  the nonnegativity  of 
gross  investment  is a qualification  of the theory.  Though  I defend  the use 
of a theory  that ignores  the constraint  only as an approximation,  I think 
it is a pretty  good approximation.  The key issue is not whether  investors 
find themselves  regretting  past investment,  but whether  they ever find 
their  planning  process  constrained  by the belief that they will need more 
capital  this  year  than  next year.  Reductions  in demand  are almost  always 
unpleasant  surprises. 
Christopher  Sims raised the point that the use of a service price of 
capital  requires  that stringent  capital-aggregation  conditions  hold. Again, 
I defend the use of a service  price as a good approximation  to a world 
in which the conditions  do not actually  hold. Sims' criticism  would be 
much  more convincing  if he could give a practical  example  of a case in 
which  the  formula  seriously  misled  an  investor. 
William  Brainard  pointed  out that investors  presumably  discount  the 
future excess rents in forming their values of q, and that this would 
lengthen the implied distribution  of delivery  lags. He is right, but the 
magnitude  of the bias is small, and I would guess  that it is dominated  by 
the  bias  in the opposite  direction  caused  by measurement  errors. 
Franco Modigliani  and I have discussed  the evidence on Bischoff's 
putty-clay  investment  function to the point of complete agreement  on 
the facts, particularly  that there  is an important  discrepancy  between  the 
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Modigliani  defends Bischoff's  equation as a workable approximation, 
while I am concerned  about  its value as a measure  of the importance  of 
the putty-clay  phenomenon. 
Every  reader  of the paper  seems  to have a different  reason  for thinking 
that  the long-term  interest  rate  belongs  in the investment  equation  in place 
of or alongside  the short  rate.  William  Brainard  pointed  out that  the logic 
of my model requires  that the term  of the relevant  interest  rate be about 
as long as the delivery  lag, not necessarily  the same term as is generally 
used in money-demand  functions. He  also criticizes the expectations 
theory  of the term  structure  on which  my derivation  rests.  I would  reiter- 
ate that  that  theory,  in turn,  rests  on the explicit  hypothesis  that short  and 
long assets are perfect  substitutes.  This is good theory, even if the hy- 
pothesis  is wrong.  Franco  Modigliani  argued  that  the putty-clay  hypothe- 
sis completely  invalidates  my demonstration  that  only  the short  rate  should 
matter.  The paper  concedes  this as a matter  of exact theory,  but claims 
that  the formula  based  on the short  rate  is a workable  approximation.  His 
statement  that putty-clay  makes  the long rate alone the relevant  interest 
rate for investment  is unconvincing  to me. Investors  face the same issue 
of optimal scheduling  of investment  under putty-clay  as under putty- 
putty.  Working  through  the scheduling  problem  will give the same  condi- 
tions as appear  in my derivation.  Then it is just a question  of developing 
a useful  approximation. 
Modigliani  and Stephen  Goldfeld (in his remarks  recorded  below) 
raise  questions  about  the money-demand  function  that I use to close the 
model in order to work out the implications  of alternative  investment 
functions.  Most  of the disagreement  relates  to my inclusion  of a time  trend 
in the money-demand  equation,  which Goldfeld attacks  as unwarranted 
by theory.  I don't  know  why theory  rules  out an upward  trend  in the pro- 
ductivity  of the use of money;  it seems  to me that technical  change  is just 
as important  here as anywhere.  In any case, arguing  that the coefficient 
on the time trend  should  be zero puts the econometrician  in a bind when 
it turns  out to be significantly  different  from  zero. The rest  of the disagree- 
ment  comes from the fairly  long distributed  lag on income  that Goldfeld 
finds.  Why do people  take so long to adjust?  We disagree  least about  the 
magnitude  of the interest-rate  coefficient  in the money-demand  function 
itself. Obviously,  my own work in this area is very casual. One of the 
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ough empirical  investigation  of aggregate  asset supplies and demands, 
including  money. 
General  Discussion 
Stephen  Goldfeld  expressed  his dissatisfaction  with the LM curve  de- 
veloped in the appendix,  which is a critical  ingredient  in Hall's calcula- 
tions.  He argued  that the inclusion  of a time trend  in the money-demand 
function  was not consistent  with theory,  according  to which the trend  in 
income and in interest  rates should explain  the trend in velocity. Gold- 
feld stressed  that, despite  Hall's "markup"  of the interest  elasticity  in the 
regression  equation,  Hall's LM curve  was dramatically  steeper  than the 
one implied  by Goldfeld's  results.  In particular,  Hall's estimates  imply 
that  a 1 percent  increase  in GNP, given  M1,  raises  interest  rates  by about 
17 percent,  or about 85 basis points at his illustrative  5 percent  interest 
rate.  In contrast,  Goldfeld's  equations  imply  a rise of only 15 basis  points 
if both interest  rates are allowed  to adjust,  or 50 basis points if the time 
deposit  rate  is held constant.  To Goldfeld,  the estimates  of 15 to 50 basis 
points  provided  a plausible  bound  for the steepness  of the LM curve,  and 
Hall's  curve  clearly  lies outside  this  range. 
A number  of participants  stressed  both the importance  and the im- 
plausibility  of the assumption  in the Jorgenson-Hall  model that no in- 
vestor  is ever  stuck  with  excessive  stocks  of any  capital  good. In their  view, 
the focus on short-term  interest  rates  and  near-term  profitability  in Hall's 
paper  rested  on that  assumption.  John  Shoven  pointed  out that  the overall 
investment  function  is an aggregation  of micro  demands  for capital  goods; 
the aggregation  makes  clear  the importance  of the composition  of aggre- 
gate demand,  the composition  of the existing  capital  stock, and the vari- 
ation  in rates  of depreciation  across  sectors  of the economy.  When  these 
various  microeconomic  factors  are  recognized,  the  probability  seems  over- 
whelming  that at least some firms  will be constrained  by the zero floor  on 
gross investment.  Benjamin  Friedman  argued  that the mere concern  by 
investors  that  they  might  be stuck  with  excessive  amounts  of capital  goods 
is enough  to invalidate  the Hall view. He stressed  the transactions  costs 
involved  in acquiring  and  financing  capital  goods, as well as the heteroge- 
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liquidity  important  to a firm  and give it cause  for concern  about  the com- 
position of its assets and liabilities.  Firms have choices in financing  in- 
vestment  among  long debt, short  debt, and equities,  and a further  choice 
on the timing  of funding  out fixed-investment  projects.  Friedman  agreed 
with Hall that any theory of investment  demand  has to simplify  these 
complex  decisions.  But he disagreed  with  Hall's strategy  of simplification 
by focusing  on the short-term  interest  rate;  in his view,  the  bond  and  equity 
yield would be the preferred  place to start. All of this, Friedman  con- 
tended,  bore  on what  he considered  to be a key question  neglected  in Hall's 
analysis:  What is the proper  discount  rate to apply to expected future 
returns  from  the acquisition  of a capital  good, given  that  ownership  of the 
capital  asset  has implications  for the structure  of the firm's  liabilities? 
Martin  Feldstein  reminded  the group  that the Hall-Jorgenson  concept 
of the rental  price  or cost of capital  is an amalgam,  reflecting  the interest 
rate on debts, the dividend-price  ratio on equities,  and a variety  of tax 
variables  as well. Indeed,  Feldstein  recalled,  in some of their  initial  work 
the interest  rate  was assumed  constant,  and yet the cost of capital  varied 
a good deal because  of changes  in the tax laws. Feldstein  saw no theo- 
retical presumption  that investment  would respond with equal speed 
or magnitude  to changes  in all components  of the cost of capital. For 
example,  a change  in interest  rates  and a change  in tax depreciation  rules 
might  have the same  impact  on the cost of capital,  and yet have different 
impacts on the optimal replacement  decision and hence on scrapping 
capital goods. Feldstein suspected that, even in  a putty-clay world, 
changes  in the cost of capital  that affect  optimal  replacement  may lead to 
especially  rapid  responses  of gross  investment.  Feldstein  also commented 
that, even if one granted  that  desired  gross  investment  is always  positive, 
the exclusive  focus on short-run  calculations  would not be justified  in a 
putty-clay  technology.  If an investing  firm  locks itself into a particular 
capital-labor  ratio, it must worry  about  the cost of capital  in the future; 
for one thing, its competitors  will be making  investments  in the future 
based  on capital  costs that  prevail  at the time. 
Pentti  Kouri  contrasted  the standard  Keynesian  theory  of investment 
that he accepted  with Hall's formulation.  In the standard  theory, the 
capital  stock  is fixed  in the short  run,  while  the valuation  of capital  is vari- 
able; the latter  is determined  by capitalizing  expected  returns  on invest- 
ment goods at prevailing  interest  rates. The values attached  to capital 
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production  costs or supply  price of capital  goods. In the long run, how- 
ever, the price  of capital  becomes  essentially  constant,  matching  long-run 
production  costs;  meanwhile,  the stock of capital  becomes  a variable  and 
is determined  by the demand  for capital services.  As Kouri  interpreted 
them, Jorgenson  and Hall really  offer  a theory  of the demand  for capital 
services,  which  is thus  a theory  of long-run  capital  stock,  but not a theory 
of investment.  Tobin,  on the other  hand,  offers  a short-run  theory  of how 
capital  assets  are evaluated  and thus of how investment  is motivated. 
In this framework,  Kouri  saw the short-term  interest  rate as the key to 
investment  decisions  only in the unrealistic  case in which  the capital  stock 
is completely  adjustable-essentially, a liquid asset. In that world, de- 
mand and supply  for capital  services  are always  in balance  and there is 
no problem  in determining  investment. 
Martin  Neil Baily  approved  of Hall's  methodology  of focusing  on basic 
issues rather  than attempting  to distill point estimates  from time-series 
regressions.  But Baily shared  Kouri's  concern about the distinction  be- 
tween capital  stock and capital  services.  In particular,  he felt that hours 
of capital  services  rather  than capital  stock should  enter  into the produc- 
tion function.  The decision  to use capital  for more hours was different 
from a substitution  in technique  that altered capital-labor  proportions 
per  hour  of work. 
Edward  Gramlich  and Lawrence  Klein  argued  that  Hall's fiscal  multi- 
pliers  were  biased  downward.  Gramlich  suggested,  first,  that  the marginal 
propensity  to consume  over a full year may be significantly  larger  than 
the 0.36 figure  used by Hall. Second,  he felt that a macro  model should 
allow for an inventory  accelerator  that is distinct  from and more rapid 
than a general  investment  accelerator.  Klein underlined  the critical  role 
of strong  inventory  responses  in American  business  cycles. He regarded 
a figure  of roughly 1?/2 for the expenditure  multiplier  over a one-year 
period  as a well-established  econometric  finding.  Replying  to Gramlich's 
first  point,  Hall found  it hard  to see how the MPC  out of GNP could  much 
exceed 0.36. Even if the short-run  MPC out of disposable  income were 
close to one, which few economists  believe, the response of disposable 
income  to changes  in GNP is sharply  limited  by taxes and  other  influences 
to a value  of around  one-half.  His parameter  is the product  of these  two. 